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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Metal Trades Council of
New London County
Opinion

and

and
Award

Electric Boat Division,
General Dynamics Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been duly designated
in accordance with the contract between the above named Union
and Company, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties, renders the following Opinion and Award:
The stipulated issue is:
Except for Section 6B(1) and (2), is an employee
entitled to a remedy, if within the meaning of
Section 6, overtime has not been distributed equally and the Company has not equalized overtime within 90 days after notice as provided for in Section
8 of Article X? If so, what shall the remedy be?
Hearings were held on April 24 and August 29, 1973 in
groton, Connecticut.

Representatives of the above named part-

ies appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.

Post hearing

briefs were filed0
As indicated by the stipulated issue this proceeding is
in the nature of a request by the parties for a "declaratory
judgment" on the question of remedy.

What is not before this

Arbitrator is whether the Company breached Section 6 of the
contract or even what constitutes a breach of that Section.
Rather there is a

hypothetical assumption that the Company

has not distributed or equalized overtime within the meaning

- 2 of Section 6, leaving for the Arbitrator herein, only the
questions of whether an adversely affected employee is entitled to a remedy, and if so what that remedy should be.
The Arbitrator is careful to note that unless agreed to
or stipulated otherwise by the parties, if an actual grievance is presented alleging the Company's failure to comply
with Section 6, the threshold question would be as it is not
in the instant case, whether Section 6 was breached, and if
so, only then what the remedy should be if any0
I see no basic dispute between the parties over the fundamental principle that contracts, labor as well as commercial,
may not be breached with impunity.

In the event of a breach

some remedy or relief is appropriate, from nominal to substantial, depending on the circumstances and damages.
In the instant case, if the Company has failed to comply
with the provisions of Section 6 of the contract, and under
the circumstances set forth in the stipulated issue, this
Arbitrator would fashion some type of appropriate remedy for
the aggrieved employee(s).

Because there is no particular

factual case presently before me, I am not now prepared to
specifically pin-point what that remedy would be.
tail possibilities are obvious.

But cer-

Remedies could range from a

cease-and-desist order to an order directing the Company to
perform on the contract specifically by according the grievant a priority opportunity to prospective overtime work for a
reasonable period of time until his overtime opportunities
had been equalized,,

- 3 While I agree generally with the Company's argument that
an arbitrator should not grant in arbitration what the Union
failed to achieve in collective bargaining, I do not rule out
the possibility of awarding money damages as a remedy.

There

may well be circumstances under which an adequate or practicable redress of a breach of Section 6 may be achieved only by
the payment of compensation to the grievant(s).
However, I choose to wait the presentation of a particular grievance before I will, or indeed can determine what
type of remedy is proper and appropriate, if the contract has
been breached.
As stipulated by the parties, I retain jurisdiction for
purposes of further proceedings and/or for implementation of
the foregoing.

Eric /3\z
Arbitrator

DATED: November 28, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 28th day of November, 1973, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 3, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO
and
General Instrument

AWARD
Case #1330 0055 75 EXP,

Corporation

This is an expedited arbitration under the Expedited
Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association,
The stipulated and submitted issue is:
Does the Employer have the right
unilaterally to change the work
week from that set forth in Article
3.1? If not what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on January 18, 1975 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD pursuant to Sections
19 and 20 of the Expedited Labor Arbitration Rules:
1.

The Employer's action in shutting down for

one week during the month of December, 1974 is
not part of the issue submitted to this arbitration.
I am not persuaded that the representatives of the
parties who agreed to an Expedited Arbitration

-2and who jointly stipulated the issue mutually
agreed that the issue would cover any more than
the Employer's shut-down of the Micro-Electronic
Division on January 6, 1975 and the Employer's
plan to possibly shut-down that Division on
subsequent Mondays during the month of January,
1975.

Inasmuch as the issue was jointly sub-

mitted to expedited arbitration it cannot go
beyond the scope of what was mutually agreed to.
2.

The Employer's unilateral act of shutting down

the Micro-Electronic Division on January 6, 1975
and its plan to possibly shut-down that Division
on subsequent Mondays in January, constituted
(on January 6th) and would constitute a lay-off
of the bargaining unit employees of that Divis ion
not pursuant to the requirements of Article VIII
of the contract and hence in violation of the layoff and seniority provisions of that Article.
Therefore, in that regard the Employer does not
have the right unilaterally to change the work
week from that set forth in Article 3.1.
As a remedy for January 6, 1975 each bargaining
unit employee of that Division who did not work
that day and who would not have been laid off
had the lay-off provisions of Article VIII been
followed, shall be made whole for the time lost.

-3Prospectively the Employer shall have the
option to either cease and desist from implementing said Plan; or if it implements the Plan to pay
as damages a days pay in each instance to any
bargaining unit employee who does not work as a
consequence of the shut-down and who would not
have been laid off under Article VIII.

Eric J/ Schmertz
DATED: January 20, 1975
STATE OF New York
)ss:.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twentieth day of January, 1975, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO,
Local 238 (Providence, R.I.

OPINION

AND

AWARD

Case #1330-0856-74

and
General Electric Company

BACKGROUND
On or about January 26, 1970, the International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (hereinafter the
"Union") and General Electric Company (hereinafter the "Company")
entered into a National Agreement to run until May 26, 1973.
(Joint Ex. 1, Preamble, Art. XXX).

This contract superseded a

prior National Agreement between the parties which ran from
October 3, 1966 until October 26, 1969.
Art. XXIX).

(Joint Ex. 2, Preamble,

Formal negotiations prior to the 1970-1973 agreement

began on August 12, 1969.

(Joint Ex. 14).

These had been pre-

ceded by the work of pre-negotiation sub-committees which had
explored certain contract language proposals (Id., Tr. 17, 22;
Joint Ex. 10).

Negotiations

continued until October 26, 1969,

when in the absence of agreement, the Union went on strike.
(Tr. 28).

Thereafter, commencing on November 7, 1969, and con-

tinuing until sometime in January 1970, negotiations were conducted under the auspices of the Federal Mediation Service (Tr. 28-29;
Joint Ex. 14).

-2-

The initial grievance which led to this special arbitration was filed by Local 238 of the union in Providence, Rhode
Island on December 13, 1972 (Tr. 2; Joint Ex. 3).

The matter

was submitted to arbitration on April 12, 1974 after failure
of resolution between the parties (Tr. 3, 4; Joint Ex.'s 4, 5,
6 and 7).

The Undersigned was selected as the arbitrator and

hearings were held on October 16 and November 4, 1974.

The

parties filed post hearing briefs.
Pursuant to the submission (Joint Ex. 7), the issue to be
resolved is:
"Did the Company and the Union, by agreeing to Artie VI, Section 5, of the 19701973 GE-IUE National Agreement, eliminate
the established practice of paying certain
jobs on the basis of merit steps above
'Job Rate1 in certain plants of the Company's
Lamp Division represented by the IUE, so
that hourly rated day work employees on
such a job would automatically progress
beyond the rate designated as the 'Job Rate'
for that job to the top rate paid for the
job on the basis of merit?"
The parties have agreed that the arbitrator is to decide
only the issue set forth above and is not to fashion a remedy.
It is stipulated that if the Union is successful, the parties
will decide upon appropriate remedies (Tr. 5).

Thus, the instant

controversy involves the interpretation of Article VI, Section 5
of the 1970-1973 National Agreement (Joint Ex. 1, p.23).

-3-

The parties agree that prior to the execution of the 19701973 agreement, certain hourly rated and salaried employees were
advanced in accordance with a progression schedule which provided
for increases by steps according to the amount of time the
employee was in his job, from the date of hiring until the top
of the progression schedule was reached (Joint Ex. 2, Art. VI).
Thereafter, the 1966-1969 contract provided in pertinent part:
"Any further increase in rate for any
employee above the top of the progression
schedule up to the job rate for his job,
...shall be based on the employee's performance on the job..." (Joint Ex. 2, Art VI, 5(c)
(1) P.24).
Thus, when the employee had, by steps,
reached the top of the progression schedule his
further advancement was dependent on merit.
(Id; Tr. 20).
The Union was dissatisfied with this procedure since it vested authority in a company
foreman to

subjectively select those who would

receive merit increases (Tr. 22; Un. Ex. 1).

At

the prenegotiation state, the Union on August 5,
1969 proposed a revision of Article VI of the

-4-

contract, the effect of which would have
abandoned merit increases in favor of
automatic progression as a function of time
beyond the top of the progression schedule
until the employee reached the "job rate or
top paid rate, whichever is higher..." (Joint
Ex. 10, p. 22-23, Tr. 9).

Aside from the important face-to-face negotiations which
will be discussed below, the Company filed a formal response to
the Union proposal on October 7, 1969 (Joint Ex. 11, pp. 13, 14
and proposed Article VI, Section 5; Tr. 9).

This Company pro-

posal included an "automatic progression to job rate" and omitted
any mention of merit increases for hourly rated employees.
Ex. 11, p. 13, 14).

(Joint

Moreover, item 8 noted that revised Article

VI was to "continue automatic progression for salaried employees
as currently provided, but correct language to accommodate change
in item 7 above," which dealt with hourly rated employees (Id.).
The effect of the Company's proposal is seen in the
proposed contract language submitted to the Union on October 7
(Joint Ex. 11).

There it was stated that "each hourly rated

employee will progress on steps from his starting rate to the
job rate of his job in accordance with the following progression
schedules provided his performance progress is satisfactory"
(Joint Ex. 11, Art. VI, 5 (a) (3) ).

The proposed language made

-5-

the progression schedules "mandatory as long as the employee
is retained on the job.

In the event that an employee's per-

formance progress is not satisfactory, such employee will be
removed from the job."

(Joint Ex. 11, Art. VI, 5 (a) (4) ).

The Union officially responsed with its own counterproposal on October 21, 1969 (Joint Ex. 12).

Under the heading

"Hourly Rated Employees" in part (3) the Union proposed that
employees who have progressed to the top of the applicable
progression schedule... (set out in (2) to mean "job rate or top
rate...or to the top of progression schedule whichever is less")
but whose "rate of pay is below the job rate or top paid rate for
his particular job, be given further" increases by step "until
he reaches the job rate, or top paid rate, whichever is higher."
The Company formally responded on December 6, 1969
Ex. 13).

(Joint

In Attachment A thereto, the Company proposed an

automatic progression schedule from starting rate to job rate
(Id, Art. Vi, 5 (a) (4) ).

Moreover, it was proposed that the

"progression schedules are mandatory as long as the employee is
retained on the job." (Id. Art. VI, 5 (a) (5) ).
The final 1970-1973 National Agreement states that each
hourly rated employee will progress on steps from his starting
rate to the job rate of his job..."pursuant to stated progression
schedules (Joint Ex. 1 Art. VI, 5 (a) (4).) "The above progression
schedules are mandatory for employees on the job" (Id. Art. VI, 5
(a) (5) ).

-6The provision of the 1966-1969 agreement with regard to
merit "progression above the top of the progression schedule up
to job rate", quoted supra p. 3, which applied to both hourly
rated and salaried employees is specifically limited in the 19701973 agreement to salaried employees only.

(Contrast Joint Ex. 2,

Art. VI, 5 (c) (1) with Joint Ex. 1, Art. VI, 5 (b) (4) ).
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
1.

The Union contends that it set out to eliminate the

system of merit increases to hourly rated employees and substituted therefore a system of automatic progression throughout
the rate structure.

It insists that it bargained for and received

automatic progression and that the differences between the 19661969 agreement and the 1970-1973 contract clearly illustrate that
merit increases for hourly rated employees were abandoned with
the new agreement.
2.

The Company urges that the 1970-1973 contract language

be limiting automatic progression to "job rate" clearly contemplated that the pre-existing practice of merit increases above
"job rate" would continue.
OPINION
The nub of the present controversy is the ambiguous use
of term "job rate" both in the negotiations and the contract.
The Union's view is that as finally adopted in the contract, the
term refers to the top pay in the job while the Company views
the term as being

synonomous with top of the progression

-7schedule as those terms were used in Article VI, 5 (c) (1) of
the 1966-1969 agreement between the parties.

Although the matter

is not without its difficulties, I am satisfied, from the minutes
of the negotiations and from a fair reading of the contract, that
the Union's view must prevail.
THE MINUTES
Following delivery of the Union's August 5th proposals,
the matter of automatic progression was first discussed at the
collective bargaining session held on August 13, 1969 (Joint Ex.'s
14, 15).

The minutes of that session taken by the Company demon-

strate that the Union proposed and the Company understood that
automatic progression was to cover to the entire

rate structure

whether it was called "job rate" or "top rate" (Joint Ex. 14,
pp. 45-50); (see also Joint Ex. 15, Aug. 13, 1969, pp. 9, 10).
Thereafter, on August 26, 1969, the negotiators again
discussed the matter.

The minutes show that both parties under-

stood the proposal on automatic progression to include the top
rated paid in a classification excluding individual considerations
of red circle or transition (Joint Ex. 14, pp.54-59; Joint Ex. 15,
Aug. 26, 1969, p.9, 10).

Indeed on August 26, the Company

negotiators recognized that "job rate" and "top rate" were the
same.

(Joint Ex. 15, Aug. 26, 1969, p. 11).
On October 1, Company negotiators indicated that the

Union proposal on automatic progression was receiving careful and
serious consideration.
arguments.

They were

"impressed"

(Joint Ex. 14, pp. 707-708).

with the Union
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As noted previously, the Company filed its proposals
on October 7, 1969 (Joint Ex. 11).

In it, the Company adopted

automatic progression to job rate and dropped its insistance on
merit increases for hourly rated employees (Joint Ex. 11, pp. 13,
14).
On October 10, 1969, the negotiators met to discuss the
proposal.

At that meeting Company negotiators Baldwin and

Sorenson stated in essence that the Company had agreed to the
Union proposal on automatic progression.

The sticking point re-

lated not to merit increases but instead to some vehicle for insuring satisfactory performance. (Joint Ex. 14, pp. 872-876;
Joint Ex. 15, Oct. 10, 1969, p.9).
The Union was concerned that the Company's October 7
proposal somehow brought merit back into the picture.

Baldwin

assured the Union that "for the record, it is automatic and
mandatory".

The problem was not merit as described by Sorenson

but rather that under the old merit system the Company could retain a man on the job without an increase in the hopes that he
would develop.

Under the automatic progression system "we might

have to take people off the job".

(Id.) The vehicle the Company

sought was the language in its October 7 proposal regarding
"satisfactory performance".

From the Company's viewpoint, it

had accepted automatic progression but reserved the right to
remove an employee from a job where the work performed was
unsatisfactory.

(Compare Joint Ex. 11, Art. VI, pp. 1-3 with
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Joint Ex. 14, 872-876).

This analysis is borne out by the

Company's description of the October 10 discussion ( Un. Ex. 2),
The Union insisted that the language concerning satisfactory
performance be deleted on the ground that the Company had the
right to demand such performance in any case and the language
confused the issue of whether merit had been removed (Joint Ex.
14, p. 874; Joint Ex. 15, Oct. 10, 1969, p. 10).

Baldwin

explained:
"The intent is automatic progression and
I don't anticipate more problems with this than
we had before ....
"It is out intent that the progression
schedule is mandatory." (Id.)
The Union's proposals of October 21, 1969, though scaled
down in other respects remained insistent on automatic progression ( Joint Ex. 12).

The parties continued to debate the

problem of language regarding satisfactory performance.

There

was, however, continued agreement that automatic progression
was to apply throughout the rate structure.

Thus, Company

negotiator Hilbert stated on October 22:
"Our proposal seeks to meet the request of
the Union for giving full unlimited automatic
progression." (Joint Ex. 14, p. 1049; Joint
Ex. 15, Oct. 22, 1969, p. 14).
On December 16, 1969, the intent of the Company seems
manifestly clear.

Sorenson said:

-10-

"Essentially we have proposed a willingness to go to automatic progression for all
hourly which is a major change from our present
system." (Joint Ex. 14, p. 1491).
Statements by Baldwin and Hilbert also dramatically
recognize that automatic progression is in and the merit system
out (Joint Ex. 14, pp. 1491-1495; Joint Ex. 15, Dec. 16, 1969,
pp. 3, 4).

Only resolution of the language concerning mandatory

for employees on the job" remained (Joint Ex. 14, pp. 14941495; Joint Ex. 15 pp. 3, 4).
Finally, on December 17, Sorenson in the course of rejecting automatic progression for salaried employees stated:
"There was, admittedly, a request for automatic progression for hourly and salaried employees. We looked at it and acceeded to the Union
demand in hourly..." (Joint Ex. 14, pp. 1533-1534).
There is little doubt then, that the intent of the parties
as manifested in the negotiating sessions and position papers
was to accept automatic progression to the top of the rate
structure for hourly rated employees.
THE CONTRACT
This understanding is seen in the terms of the agreement
itself.

The provision of the 1966-1969 agreement regarding merit

increases for both hourly and salaried employees was limited in
the 1970-1973 contract to salaried employees alone (Contrast
Joint Ex. 2, Art. VI, 5 (c) (1) with Joint Ex. 1, Art. VI, 5 (b)
(4).

-11The Company's contention that merit

Increases above job

rate were not negotiated out of the contract simply does not
square with the plain language of the agreement.

If they were

not negotiated out in the process of accepting the Union's
position on automatic progression, it is illogical that the 19701973 contract would delete hourly employees from merit increases
while continuing them for salaried workers.

I do not believe

that such an obvious change would have been negotiated for no
reason whatsoever.

I deem it meaningful, not meaningless.

Also,

under the Company's interpretation, the Union achieved no more
than it had in the predecessor contract, namely automatic
progression to a point below the top rate paid for the job.

In-

deed under that interpretation it could be construed that the
Union settled for a less favorable clause than before, because
the prior provision for further progression on merit was eliminated.

I doubt that that was the bargain.
The Union's view of automatic progression is the only one

which renders the agreement reasonable and logical.

It comports

with the wording of the contract and with the intent of the parties
as I have gleaned them from the negotiations.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company and the Union by agreeing to Article VI,
Section 5 of the 1970-1973 National Agreement did eliminate the
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established practice of paying certain jobs on the basis of
merit steps and did substitute therefore automatic progression
to the top rate paid for the job.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:
STATE OF New York )gg
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of March, 1975, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instruments and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
F

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 761, International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO

'
'
t
'
'
'
AWARD

and

'
r

General Electric Company
Louisville, Kentucky

'
'
t

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated April 9, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The warning and two week suspension without pay
imposed on James E. Sweat was not for just cause.
The warning shall be expunged from his record and
he shall be paid for the time lost resulting^ from
the suspension.

Eric 4. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February 2, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 2nd day of February, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 52 30 0255 71

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Local 761, International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO

'
'
'

and

'

Opinion

General Electric Company
Louisville, Kentucky

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the discipline given to James R. Sweat
was imposed for just cause.
A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky on November 15,
1971 at which time Mr. Sweat, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.

The

Post hearing

briefs were filed„
The grievant was issued a warning and suspended for two
weeks without pay for "striking and threatening a fellow employee" in violation of Section IV-4 of the Company's Rules
of conduct.
As is well settled in disciplinary cases, the burden is on
the Company to establish its case in support of that disciplinary action by clear and convincing evidence.

The evidence ad-

vanced by the Company in this case falls short of that standard.
This is not to say that the grievant did not assault a
fellow employee; but rather that in my judgment the evidence
fails to establish his guilt up to the standard required.
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The employee allegedly assaulted and the accuser, one
Roger Ramey, did not testify. Though both the Company and
Union made an effort to locate him for this hearing, he was
not to be found. The CompanyEs case is based solely on the
testimony of Company officials to whom Ramey reported the
alleged assault. None of them saw the incident and therefore
could not testify of its occurence from their own direct
knowledge. There were no other witnesses to the event, ot at
least none testified in this proceeding. On the other hand,
the grievant appeared, testified, and categorically denied the
charge.
In the absence of an opportunity to cross examine Ramey,
and in view of the well settled proposition that an accused and
his accuser should confront each other in the course of the
adjudicatory process, especially where there are no witnesses
to this kind of an incident and where the accuser complains
it was he who was physically assaulted, secondary evidence of
the type presented herein is not adequate. Therefore I cannot
conclude that Ramey's bare written statement of the incident
(Company Exhibit #2) or Foreman Ferguson's testimony regarding
the demeanor of Ramey and the grievant in his office following
the latter's report of the alleged assault, are enough to cure
the fundamental evidentiary defects in the Companyjs case.
Why would Ramey complain to Company representatives that
he had been assaulted by the grievant? Obviously one answer is
that the complaint was true. Yet, absent Ramey's own testimony,
or direct supportive evidence of the assault, I am unable to
reach that conclusion definitively. For there are other possibilities as well. How can we be even reasonably certain that

-3 —

due to some possible instability, as evidenced for example by his
"disappearance" and/or refusal to make himself available to
testify, Ramey did not imagine, exaggerate or even fabricate
the charge.

It should be clear that I make no determination

on the possibilities one way or the other, because as the
Company argues, Ramey's absence could well be due to fear.
Rather I refer to alternate possibilities merely to point up
the fact that the Company's evidence, in the absence of Ramey's
own testimony of what happened or that of witnesses who saw or
heard the "assault", is not enough to establish the grievant's
culpability to my satisfaction, and hence too frail to sustain
the discipline imposed in this case.

Accordingly on that basis

alone, namely that the Company's case fails to come up to the
standard of proof traditionally required in disciplinary cases,
the warning and suspension imposed on the grievant is reversed.
The warning shall be expunged from his record and he shall be
paid for the time lost.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
i
'
i

Local 32B, Service Employees International '
Union, AFL-CIO
'
i
'
'

and

Gimbel Brothers

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Manuel DeJesus? If not what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New York State
Board of Mediation on June 26, 1973 at which time Mr. DeJesus,
hereinafter referred to as the grievant and representatives of
the above named Union and Company appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was ex-

pressly waived.
The Company charges the grievant with a cumulative unsatisfactory work record, culminating on January 9, 1973 with
his negligent failure to properly set or check the operation of
an automatic water pump essential to the maintenance of the
water facilities and air conditioning in the store during the
night.
The Company asserts that the grievant's prior record includes failures or refusals to properly perform work assignments,
insubordination and a generally "deteriorating work performance".
It points out that it was his specific assignment at the
conclusion of business on January 9, 1973 to be certain that
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the automatic water pump was set and operating properly; that
if this is not done the air conditioning system within the
store will shut down during the course of the night causing
serious damage to perishable and refrigerated inventory and to
the sensitive computer machinery as well as to disrupt other
facilities requiring water.
Though in the instant case the inoperative nature of
the pump was discovered during the night by the security force,
thereby preventing serious damage, the Company argues that the
grievant's negligence in failing to either set or properly
check out the operation of the pump, together with his prior
record, about which he had been previously warned, warrants
his discharge.
Despite the grievant's denial of the charge concerning
the pump on January 9, 1973 (he asserts he checked it out and
that it was operating properly), I conclude that he either did
not set the two requisite switches in the correct position or
did not make an adequate observation of whether or how the pump
was running.

I cannot find that someone else iris-set the pump,

or "sabotaged" its operation after the grievant made his check
and left for the day.

Also there is not dispute over the

potentially serious consequences if the pump fails to operate
during the night.

The Company's computers and the computer

room, which operate 24 hours a day, must be kept cool by air
conditioning, and the latter facility is depdendant on an adequate
supply of water generated by the automatic water pump.

The same

-3is true for the candy department, the refrigeration systems
of the store restaurants, and other departments storing
perishable goods under refrigeration.

Additionally the pump

generates water for the stores' sprinkler system, steam pipes,
drinking fountains and sanitary facilities.
Despite the foregoing, the instant circumstances do not
warrant the extreme penalty of discharge.

As I see it the

Company is contending first that prior to January 9, 1973 the
grievant had been put on notice, through the imposition of
classical "progressive discipline", that his work performance
was not satisfactory, and second that he was solely responsible
for the failure to set the automatic water pump on January 9, 1973
The facts do not fully support these basic contentions, and hence
I am constrained to conclude that a lesser penalty than discharge
is proper.
The grievant neither speaks nor understands English to
any significant

extent.

His testimony, through an interpreter,

revealed to me that he did not understand how the automatic
water pump operated, more specifically that he was unaware the
pump contained two switches that had to be set.

I am satisfied

that his testimony in this regard was not contrived.

There is

no evidence that the Company accorded him any instruction, even
rudimentary, in the operation of this particular pump.

That he

may have been seen by supervisory personnel operating both

-4switches on the pump is simply not enough to show that he knew
what was involved, nor, more importantly can it excuse the
Company from its fundamental duty to be certain, through
appropriate instruction if necessary, that an employee assigned
a responsibility of such obvious importance, knows what that
responsibility entails.

This is especially true where as here,

the employee is burdened by a language barrier and where the
Company relies on the written instruction on the machine.

In

short though I conclude that grievant failed to properly perform
his duties the night of January 9, 1973, I must attribute part
of the blame for the consequences to the Company because it did
not take ordinary and expected steps to instruct the grievant
or see that he understood what he was to do.

This is not to

say the the grievant is blameless, after all he is a plumber.
He should have sought instruction or expressed his lack of
knowledge.

Rather it is to say the the Company also should

have acted more prudently and carefully.
The Company's reliance on the grievant's prior work
performance and its warnings to him about it, do not meet the
test of "progressive discipline". Company witnesses testified
to only two instances in which the grievant failed or refused
to properly perform work as assigned. Both times he was spoken
to, or warned, but only orally. There is no evidence in the
record that he was previously warned in writing^or suspended.
It is well settled that "progressive discipline" involves at
least written warnings if not a suspension, prior to the final
penalty of discharge, in order to clearly and unmistakably place
an offending employee on notice that unless his record improves
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his job is in jeopardy, and to afford him an opportunity to
rehabilitate himself.

Unless the warnings are written and/or

unless a suspension is imposed the notice and rehabilitative
purposes of the progressive discipline system are not brought to
bear with the necessary impact and impressiveness.

So, the

Company's reliance on what actions it took prior to January 9,
1973, in support of its discharge of the grievant for his
"cumulative record", falls short of what is traditionally
required in such cases.
Based on all the foregoing I conclude that the penalty of
discharge was both premature and toosevere.

I conclude that a

two week suspension is adequate.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the
discharge of Manuel DeJesus. A
disciplinary suspension of two weeks
is adequate. His discharge is therefore reduced to a two week disciplinary
suspension. He shall be reinstated and
made whole for the balance of the time
lost.

Eric J. Schinertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 20, 1973
STATE OF New York
),
COUNTY OF New York )'
On this twentieth day of July, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

11 • * -J
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD
OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS,
LOCAL 8-718

Case #12300013-72

-andTHE GULF UNITED NUCLEAR CORPORATION1i

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been duly
designated in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement
between the above named parties, and dated March 5, 1970,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD.

The grievance of Blase A. Sanzone
is arbitrable.
The Company did not violate the
contract when it denied Blase A.
Sanzone promotion to Lead Man,
Commercial Fuel Quality Control
Inspector.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 25, 1972
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 25th day of August, 1972, before me personnally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
i
;

OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS,
LOCAL 8-718
-and-

'
OPINION
'
' Case #1230013-72
i

THE GULF UNITED NUCLEAR CORPORATION1i

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract when it denied
Blase A. Sanzone a promotion to Lead Man, Commercial Fuel
Quality Control Inspector?

If so, what should the remedy

be? (At the hearing I ruled the grievance was arbitrable).
A hearing was held on April 24th, 1972 in New Haven,
Connecticut.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's

Oath.
Background

The Company posted the job of "Lead Man - Commercial
Fuel Inspector, Department 8802, Labor Grade 11."

Five

employees in Group 10 submitted bids, including the grievant
Blase A. Sanzone, a Commercial Alloy-Element Machine Operator.
The other four bidders were employed in the Quality Control
Department.

The grievant worked in the Production Department.

The position was awarded to a bidder with less seniority
than the grievant.
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Union Position

The grievant claims that in the course of his duties
as a machinist he performed the same duties required of an
inspector, using the same prints and most of the same equipment.

Furthermore, he had previously been promoted to a

leadman's job (in Production) which demonstrated a recognition of his leadership abilities.

He stated he was qualified for the disputed job as the
experience or knowledge of a machinist and inspector are almost parallel, since "basically all types of measurements and
groups and calculations are similar, and there is no dissimilarity".

He asserted that the job description of the

posted job was similar to the functions he performs as a
machinist.
Grievant also claims that he had inspection experience
(apart from that in connection with the performance of his
machinist duties) both with the Company and outside.

He

testified that "there have been many instances in the past
when the Quality Control Department has been in somewhat of
a jam and they have pulled out personnel from the Machining
Area to go over there and Quality Control parts so that they
could unwind this jam."
Furthermore, he was once a partner in a machine shop
(one of whose customers was the Company), and he inspected
all the work in that machine shop.
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The Union's other witness, Mario Proscino, a Leadman in the Machining Area, testified that he was of the
opinion that there wasn't"too much" difference between a
Quality Control Leadman and a Machine Leadman.

He testified

that Machinists and Inspectors use about the same equipment
and the same blueprints, and that "a Machinist checks the
parts before submitting them to the Inspector to make sure it
is pretty accurate."

Company's Position

The Company contends that grievant was not qualified
as an Inspector since there was nothing in the record to
show he had the ability or required experience in Quality
Control work.

Also, because of anticipated retirements from

the Quality Control Department, the Company doubts that the
grievant would be capable of instructing and training "green
inspectors".

Additionally, the Company asserts that the Lead-

man would have to cope with Quality Control Systems, procedures,
form control, specifications, equipment techniques, and
allocate assignments of Inspectors to the various jobs based
on their capabilities and experience; functions which the
grievant had not previously performed or shown ability to
perform.

The Company points out that the only reason the

grievant was in a position to submit a bid for an inspector's
job was because the Commercial Products Division was unique.
All of its departments (i.e. production, engineering and

-4quality control) are assigned to one Occupational Group,
No. 10, whereas in the other division of the Company there
are exclusive Occupational Groups for employees performing
Quality Control assignments.

The Company's Quality Control Superintendent, Nicholas
C. Kanzanas testified that the inspectors' duties consisted
of Received and Stores Inspection, In-Process Inspection,
First Piece Inspection, On-Line Inspection, Fuel Assignments,
Parts Inspection, Completed Parts and Final Assembly Inspection,
and than an Inspector would also have to know the equipment
and have a good knowledge of co-workers since the assignment
and allocation was a key aspect of the job.

He contended

that the grievant was familiar, at most, only with First
Piece

Inspection.

Philip Pizzutti, the foreman in the Quality Control
Department, testified that certain equipment and operations
are strictly quality control and not found or used by the
Production Department.

Among the more complicated equipment

used only by Quality Control were electronic strain gauge,
alpha-beta counting, and liquid penetrant inspection.

He

also testified as to the type of operations only performed
in Quality Control, with which a production machinist such
as grievant would not have experience, including dye penetrant,
gamma scintillation counter, alpha-beta counters, gamma
counters, and ultrasonic control.

-5He stated he had a long, amiable association with the
grievant but never knew him to have acquired qualifications
for quality control work either in his prior employment or
with the Company, nor did the bid filed by the grievant indicate any such qualification.

He further stated that the

grievant had no experience in that type of work and that experience was a necessary qualification for the job in question,
since the Leadman would be required to instruct and assist
new inspectors.

Relevant Contractual Provisions

Section 23.42 in pertinent part reads:
The employee's bid will outline his work
experience and other factors which he may
feel are pertinent to the qualification
determination. Upon completion of the posting period, the Company will look first to
candidates who have filed bids with the
Employee Relations Department from within
the job classification group where the job
opening exists and will select the employee
with the greatest seniority bidding for jobs
in labor grades 5 or higher, providing he or
she is qualified to perform the work. (Emphasis
added).

Discussion

In cases of this type I require the employer to show
that its by-passing of the more senior bidder was not
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

At the hearing there was considerable confusion as to

-6the job that was bid upon.

The contract does not contain

any position as listed in the bidding.

The entire class-

ification for Group 10 consisted of the following jobs:
Group #10
Labor
Commercial Fuel Quality Control Inspection
Senior Commercial Fuel Operator
Commercial Alloy/Element Machine Operator
Lead Man-Senior Commercial Fuel Operator
Lead Man-Commercial A/E Machine Operator
Commercial Alloy/Element Senior Hand Finisher
Commercial Fuel Operator
Commercial Fuel Quality Control Inspector-Ltd.
Commercial Assembly/Element Machine Operator
-Repetitive
Commercial Fuel Q.C. Helper

& Grade
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
8

The Company asserted that the job posted was a recognized
one, that a deceased employee filled such a position, and that
the job requirements consisted of a blend of a Leadman and a
Quality Control Fuel Inspector, both of which are specified
in the contract and both of which had specific job descriptions.

The grievant first testified that when he bid, he was
bidding on the position of "Leadman, Senior Commercial Fuel
Operator".

However, during the course of the hearing, the

grievant asserted that he was bidding on an Inspector's job
and that he had the qualifications to be a Leadman Inspector.

The grievant was employed as a Commercial Assembly/Element
Machine Operator and there is no dispute over his qualifications
and ability in that capacity.

It is also true that the

grievant had been selected by the Company to be a Leadman -

-7Commercial Alloy/Element Operator and occupied that job
satisfactorily until reversed by an arbitration decision.

But the job in question is that of a Leadman over all
the inspectors in the Commercial Products Division.

I

conclude that the grievant's prior experience and demonstrated
capabilities in Production, including his Leadman assignment
fall short of establishing his ability to perform the specific
duties of Leadman Inspector.

The record discloses that the disputed position requires
a broad range of important inspection activities, many of
which are unique to Quality Control, and that the new Leadman
would have to spend a significant portion of his time instructing and training a substantial number of new inspectors in
those procedures.

Although the grievant testified he was familiar with the
general duties of an inspector; that he had used the same equipment used by quality control people; and that on occasion he
had performed quality control duties, I conclude his experience
concerning the quality control function is limited to
observations and to experiences indigenous only to the work of
a machinist and Leadman in production, and perhaps an
occasional "first piece inspection" to help quality control
dispose of a backlog.

However it is undisputed that certain

equipment and operations, important to the inspection function,
are found and performed only in the quality control department.

-8I am persuaded that as to those the grievant simply would
be unfamiliar with them.

Grievant conceded that if he were given the position,
he would have to spend "time learning the various jobs" and
also admitted that someone would have to spend some time with
him "breaking him in on the various jobs".

The foreman who was consulted with respect to the
decision knew the grievant and was aware of his background.
I accept his testimony that the grievant was not qualified
since he had not done any quality control work, and that the
grievantTs lack of experience would be an even greater
impediment in view of the training and allocation of work
which the Leadman would be required to perform.

Finally, there is the pertinent contract clause.

The

contract makes a distinction in the selection of employees
dependent upon the grade of the job.

For the job in question,

the contract requires that a senior employee should be
selected provided that "he is qualified to perform the job"
(emphasis supplied).

It is well settled that this phraseology

means that a bidder must be able to assume the duties of the
job bid without training and without an unusual period of breakin.

Based on the record, including the grievant's own testimony

I cannot fault the Company's determination that a significant

-9-

period of training and/or break in would be necessary before
the grievant was qualified to perform quality control
inspection work as a Leadman.

Consequently, at least at the time of his bid, the
grievant did not meet the contract requirements for the
upgrading, and the Company's refusal to accept his bid cannot
therefore be deemed arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable.
Hence it was not violative of the contract.

T
z L^^
~ [j
Eric J/ Schmertz
•
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Lay Faculty Association, Local 1261,
American Federation of Teachers

RULING
Case #1330 0996 74

and
Henry M. Hald H.S. Association

The above named Union failed to appear at the duly
scheduled hearing on April 7, 1975. This was the
Union's second non-appearance at a scheduled hearing in this matter. The grievant, Mr. Robert Shannon
failed to appear as well.
The Undersigned granted the motion by the above
named Employer to dismiss the grievance of and on
behalf of Mr. Shannon, on the record thus far presented, and with prejudice, because of the Union's failure to proceed.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

April / 1975

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 1034, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
The Hertz Corporation

In accordance with Section 11 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated June 3, 1971 between Local 1034, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, hereinafter referred to as the "Union", and The Hertz
Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Company", the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a
dispute relating to the Union's grievance that bargaining unit work
has been removed from the bargaining unit and assigned to non-unit
personnel.
Hearings were held at the offices of the New York State Board
of Mediation on June 10 and 11, and November 25, 1974, and April
14 and May 14, 1975 at which time representatives of the Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Post-hearing briefs were filed.

The Arbitrator's Oath was express-

ly waived.
The Union's grievance is that at about the time the Company
closed its offices at 645 First Avenue, New York City, with
consequent layoffs of certain Union reservationists, the Company
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hired three non-Union employees to handle socalled "road calls",
a function which the Union asserts could have been, and by contract and custom should have been assigned to three of the laidoff bargaining unit reservationists.

By this arbitration the Union

seeks reinstatement of the three reservationists with appropriate
back pay.
A decision in this matter involves consideration and resolution of the following questions:
1.

What is road call work?

2.

Was the handling of road calls by contract

or custom, exclusive work of the bargaining unit?
3.

Did the Company have the right to assign road

call work to non-union personnel?
4.

Were the reservationists qualified to per-

form the work performed by the road call managers?
5.

What was the intent of the parties with re-

gard to their agreement of April 19, 1973 (Joint
Exhibit 2)?
Throughout this proceeding there has been substantial disagreement over what the term "road call" means.

For some witnesses,

the term denotes any call from a customer complaining about the
operation of a leased vehicle.

(Tr. 216, 219, 224, 319).

For

others the term seems to be narrower, e.g. calls about the cars
which can be handled with a minimum of advice from the Company
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(Tr. 38.45, 364).

These include cases where the Company is able

to resolve the problem over the telephone with the customer
132).

(Tr.

A third category of road call includes only situations

where the Company must make arrangements to have the car towed,
repaired or retrieved (Tr. 65-69, 230, 326-348, 351).

A fourth

and most expansive definition would include any customer complaint
whatsoever (Tr. 216,

224).

The number of all such calls in any category; the Company
policy with regard to who shall handle such problems and the
degree of expertise required to do so are all vigorously debated
issues in this arbitration.
There are some matters, however, as to which the record
appears to be clear.
(A).

The Company maintained

a road service department to

handle road calls which required that a vehicle be towed, repaired or retrieved (Tr. 79, 144, 157-8, 230, 274, 308, 327-342).
This type of operation was maintained by the Company prior to the
collective bargaining agreement with the Union (Tr. 77, 234-5);
during the period of the agreement, except for a brief period
when the work was contracted to an independent contractor called
Fleet Aid (Tr, 86-87, 236, 298, 343), and since the close of the
First Avenue Office (Tr. 131-2, 138, 299, 327 et s_eq_. , 347, 390).
Persons working in this operation received road calls from the
customer directly (Tr. 275, 282-285) and those routed to them from

-4telephone operators (Tr. 129-130), supervisors (Tr. 211, 235,
501), reservationists (Tr. 229, 284, 501) rental representatives
(Tr. 501) and even station managers (Tr.
(B).

277).

Reservationists regularly received road calls in

the ordinary course of their duties (Tr. 38-45, 173, 224, 503).
(C).

Reservationists were instructed to and did refer road

calls to supervisors and/or the road service department when
necessary and when such supervisory personnel were available.
(Tr. 39, 58-60, 65-66, 68, 69, 129, 185, 200, 233, 235, 244, 285,
295, 297, 322, 360-368, 501-403).
(D).

The primary responsibility of reservationists was to

handle reservation and cancellation orders and not road calls.
(Tr. 47, 50-58, 182, 194, 240, 260, 287, 310).
There is no evidence from which one could conclude that
road calls were assigned to union reservationists in the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement itself is silent on the
1
issue (Joint Exhibit 1). Nor is there any evidence that the

1.
Appendix B-f5 to the agreement (Joint Exhibit 1) relating
to Rental Representatives notes that these employees shall report
"thefts, serious accidents (and) serious customer complaints" to
the management.
calls as such.

It is doubtful at best that this relates to road
In any event no similar provision relating to

Reservationists is contained in the agreement (Joint Exhibit 1).

-5Union ever bargained for inclusion of road call work in the job
description of reservationists.

Indeed, the evidence of record

indicates that the Union submitted no proposal to the Company in
connection with the collective bargaining agreement as to placing
road calls in the job description of reservationists (Tr. 74-75,
345).

Nor was any grievance filed when the Company transferred

its road service operation to Fleet Aid (Tr. 301-302, 345).
Thus, there is no evidence of any contractual obligation to
place road call work within the bargaining unit for reservationists.

At the same time, it is clear that non-union road managers

also performed road call work throughout the period herein complained of (Tr. 327-343).
As previously indicated, however, the record is clear that
reservationists by custom, did handle some types of road calls
(Tr. 35-48, 352, 364, 381, 386).

Company policy, not surprising-

ly was to see to it that the customer was able to get about his
or her business with a minimum of problems (e.g. Tr. 474).

To

this end, it was apparently the job of everyone in the Company
regardless of job description, to assist the customer in any way
he or she could (Id.).
As to customer complaints concerning mechanical malfunctions, the record indicates that both Union and non-union personnel
had some responsibilities in the area.

Whenever such complaints

came in -- and to whomever, the recipient was to see to it that

-6the proper authorities were notified and/or the customer assisted in getting on his or her way (Id.).
By the nature of their positions, employees whose jobs
entailed dealing with the public by telephone inevitably received
road calls.

Thus, phone operators, reservationists, rental

representatives and others would in the ordinary course receive
customer complaints about cars.
Reservationists were instructed to assign such calls to
their supervisors (Tr. 185, 211, 235, 285, 295, 322, 364-368),
and all employees were to contact the road call or road service
department as to calls that required special attention -- such
as towing or repairs (Tr. 59, 79, 327-48).

The record indicates

that supervisors were not always available to handle road calls
(e.g. Tr. 39, 297).

Nor was it always possible to contact the

road service people (Tr. 59, 60).

In such a situation, which

occurred with some frequency, reservationists attempted to
handle minor road call problems themselves (Tr. 38-45, 60, 297,
322, 364).

Some reservationists contacted supervisors or manage-

ment personnel only when necessary

(Tr. 65-69, 230, 326-348, 351,

364-368), reporting aggregations of minor complaints

in batches

on sheets supplied by the Company. (Tr. 155, 169, 198, 200, 229,
230,

374).
These customer calls routinely consume some of the reserva-

tionists time, although precisely how much time depends upon
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whether a road call is defined as a specific mechanical problem
or relates to any conceivable customer complaint (see e.g.,
Company Exhibit 3, Tr. 224).

Thus, depending on definition, a

reservationist could expect to spend up to an hour or two a day
on general customer complaints or as little as a few minutes
per day on specific mechanical malfunctions

(Compare Tr. 86,

182 with Company Exhibit 3).
It is apparent that road calls of whatever definition were
by custom an incidental part of a reservationist's job.

It also

is apparent, that they were an incidental part of the job of
every employee of the Company (Tr. 474, passim).
Given the record, therefore, it is not possible to conclude
that road calls were an exclusive domain of the bargaining unit
either by contract or by custom.
Except for a brief period during which the Company contracted out its road service function to an indendent contractor
Fleet Aid, the Company has maintained and continues to maintain
a road service operation staffed with non-union personnel.
Such operations and assignments pre-date the collective
bargaining agreement by many years, continued during the existence of the agreement and are maintained to the present day.
The Union made no grievance either prior to or during the
Fleet Aid contract and apparently raises the question now only
as a result of the closing of the First Avenue Office and the

-8consequent lay-offs of its members.

Thus, although it could

not contend that the Company had no right to assign road call
work to non-union personnel, it apparently contends that in
this special instance, the work had to be offered to the senior
reservationists laid off.

This contention rests on the asser-

tion that the collective bargaining agreement requires that the
reservationists be offered the work since they are 'qualified
to perform the work of such classification" (Schedule B-(5)
Joint Exhibit 1).
The road call work previously performed by the reservation
ists involved aiding customers in situations which must be
described as relatively minor.

These included complaints of

dead batteries, malfunction in wipers, ignition lock problems
with Ford Pintos, flat tires and the like.
The road manager function includes handling of such
matters but goes well beyond them (e.g., Tr. 327-348).

The

road manager is considered to be an administrative managerial
post.

He or she is required to be able to diagnose mechanical

failure, dispatch proper help, negotiate with contractors for
towing, repairs or retrieval of cars and to operate his or her
station in the absence of higher authority (Id.).

Such func-

tions, in the main, transcend the functions performed by
reservationists in their road call work.
Thus, although the reservationists as a group could

-9presumably handle some of the road manager functions, there is
no evidence of record demonstrating that they either did or
could handle the balance of the road managers' job.
On this record, the reservationists were not qualified
2
for the post of road manager.
As of April 19, 1973, the Company had shifted its road
service operations to Fleet Aid (Tr. 343).

The parties could

not have contemplated that at or about the time the First Avenue
Office closed, job positions would open up in road service due
to the cancellation of the Fleet Aid contract in September,
1973 (Id.).
The Union's contention apparently is that since the April
agreement (Joint Exhibit 2) outlined a procedure whereby senior
reservationists would either receive severance pay or be offered
vacant positions, if any, as rental representatives, these same
reservationists would be entitled to positions as road managers
as well.

This last is based upon an alleged oral agreement by

the Company to place the displaced reservationists "in any
available position that they qualified for" (Union Brief, p.2).
Union counsel's argument in his brief is essentially this:

2.
The Union has suggested that the Company's refusal to hire
the reservationists as road managers is based upon sex discrimination.

There is no probative evidence in this record to

support such a charge.

-10the displaced reservationists were entitled by the April
agreement to any openings in the rental representative classification or to any opening for which a rental representative
might be qualified provided the reservationist was qualified
for the post.
I have previously held that the reservationists were
not qualified per se to perform the function of road manager.
Nor is there any evidence of record that a rental representative might be so qualified save for the portion of job description previously noted. Moreover, I find no probative evidence
in the record that a company representative entered into the oral
agreement alleged.
The Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October
13, 1975
STATE OF New York )sg.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this the thirteenth day of October, 1975, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
Between
Local 584, I.B.T.

AWARD
Case No. 1330 0498 75

and
Honeywell Farms, Inc.

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
Milk Industry contract between the above named parties, the
Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the company since January 21, 1975
violate Section 4 of the contract in
connection with personnel on layoff status
who were not employees of this company?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on May 5, 1975 at which time representatives of the union and company appeared and

were afforded ful

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
On the basis of all the credible testimony and
evidence submitted to me and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the union and company, I make the following
Award:
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The overall unit recall list provided
for in Section 4(c) of the Milk Industry
contract is clear on its face and must be
complied with.

However, due to the extra-

ordinary and extenuating circumstances involving this company, specifically the
fact that the company undertook a commitment to the City of New York to utilize
prospective employees from the community
surrounding the company's plant, which
commitment was made prior to the time the
company was notified that the union intended to fully utilize and enforce Section
4(c) and where said notification occurred
after the company advised the union of its
commitment to the City, the overall unit recall list shall be applied to this company on
a rotating one-for-one basis in conjunction
with the company's hiring from the community.
The company shall employ one prospective
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employee from the community and one prospective
employee from the overall unit recall list in
rotation.

Where the company is not required by

its commitment to the City to utilize prospective employees from the community, the company
shall be required to comply fully with Section
4(c).
In addition, the company shall not be required to affect the employment status of any
of its current employees even if they were employed from sources other than the overall unit
recall list inasmuch as there had been substantial
uncertainty concerning the utilization of the list.
This uncertainty has been dispelled by the definitive
action of the union and by this Award.
I emphasize that this limited departure from
strict adherence to the overall unit recall list
is due solely to the unusual and peculiar facts
of this company's situation.

I can foresee no

other circumstances in which departure from exclusive use of the overall unit recall list would
be permissible.
This Award will be effective on the date issued.

Eric J^'Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: June 3, 1975
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)
On this third day of June, 1975, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 32, OPEIU

OPINION AND DISPOSITION

and

OF

Hospital Service Plan of New Jersey

Case #74-408

In accordance with Article X of the collective bargaining agreement dated May 5, 1972, between the above named Employer
and Union, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide disputes relating to Union grievances 74-96,
74-135 and 74-148.
Hearings were held in Newark, New Jersey on March 5,
April 28, May 5 and July 7, 1975, at which time the grievant,
Theola Hosten and representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was expressly waived.

The

The hearing scheduled

for July 2, 1975 was adjourned after it was convened because the
grievant was absent.
At the request of the parties I previously rendered,
without Opinion, two Awards.

In the first dated May 7, 1975 I

denied the Employer's contention that grievance 74-135 was not
arbitrable.

In the second dated July 26, 1975 I determined the

grievant's status as a consequence of the entire proceeding.

I

-2-

reduced her discharge to a disciplinary suspension; with reinstatement without back pay; and with a warning that future misconduct on her part would, in my opinion, be grounds for summary
dismissal.
The instant document provides a brief Opinion on and is
in full disposition of all of the issues in dispute.
As noted, the three grievances relate to the same employee
Grievance 74-96 involves a disciplinary suspension imposed on
her for July 17 and 18, 1974; grievance 74-135 concerns (in addition to the arbitrability question) her three week disciplinary
suspension imposed from October 29 to November 15, 1974; and the
subject of grievance 74-348 is her discharge on November 20, 1974.
The Employer asserts that the grievant's record, particularly the disciplinary actions taken against her as referred to
in grievances 74-96 and 74-135, culminating in her offense which
is the subject of grievance 74-148, justifies her dismissal.

The

Union in this proceeding, challenges the propriety of the
Employer's action in each of the three instances, and asserts
that the grievant's discharge was not founded on just cause.
Grievance 74-96:

The two day suspension, July 17 and 18,

1974 was for just cause.

The Employer's inquiry into the reasons

and circumstance of the grievant's unauthorized absence from work
following lunch on July 5, was legitimate and reasonable.

Under

the circumstances the grievant had the duty to cooperate with that

-3-

inquiry; to explain her absence and to substantiate the medical
excuse she offered.

I find, as the Employer alleges, that her

statement that she took her child to a doctor or to a hospital
for treatment was, if not false or misleading, unsubstantiated.
It was not unreasonable for the Employer to require her to disclose the name of the doctor and the hospital and the name of the
baby sitter whom she asserted called her about her child's illness.

That the grievant did not do so, until much later in the

course of the investigation was an unjustified refusal to comply
with a reasonable inquiry into her whereabouts during hours that
she should have been at work.

Accordingly I cannot fault the

Employer's conclusion that the grievant's absence was not only unauthorized but unjustified.
suspension was

Therefore the two day disciplinary

proper and is upheld.

jferbitrability of Grievance 74-135:

I denied the Employer's

contention that this grievance was barred from arbitration or
further processing with the grievance procedure by the time limits
of Step 1 of the contractual grievance procedure simply because
the record is not clear that a Step 1 meeting was definitely
scheduled or that either party took unequivocal steps to fix a
date certain for that meeting.

The testimony on when, if at all,

a Step 1 meeting was scheduled is sharply conflicting, offsetting,
and hence indeterminative.

In the absence of a showing that a

Step 1 meeting was scheduled for a fixed date, at which either

-4side failed to appear, I cannot find that the five working day
time limit, set forth in the grievance procedure had begun to
run to bar, thereafter, further processing of the grievance.

In

short, the condition precedent to the commencement of the time
limitation, namely a scheduled Step 1 meeting, had not been met.
Therefore in my prior Award I remanded the grievance to the
grievance procedure for prospective processing in accordance
with that procedure and the time limits thereof.

Thereafter,

by stipulation in the record, the parties waived further
grievance steps on that dispute and submitted grievance 74-135
on the merits to me for determination in this proceeding.
The Merits of Grievance 74-135:

It is well settled that

presistent, wilfull defiance by an employee of managerial orders
or instructions, especially if committed in the presence of other
employees, constitutes insubordination warranting severe discipline
including discharge, irrespective of the employee's prior record.
If an employee believes that management's directives are improper
or even discriminatory or punitive, the remedy is not to defy,
but to comply and appeal for redress to the Union and through the
grievance procedure of the contract.

(The limited exceptions to

this rule are not present in the instant case).
Where there is an understandable (but not excusable)
explanation for the employee's behavior, mitigation, but not
total reversal of the disciplinary penalty is appropriate.

-5The circumstances of this grievance square with the
foregoing rules.

The Employer had reason to believe that the

grievant had been leaving her work place on the day in question
too often and for excessive periods of time.

The Employer had

similar difficulties with the grievant on prior occasions.
Specifically by example there was some question as to whether
she had the right, without authorization from the Department
Supervisors involved, to leave her department to go to that of
her Steward to discuss a problem regarding her paycheck.

At

other points that day she was told to return to her desk and
resume work.

The instant charge of insubordination arose when,

after she was expressly instructed to return to her desk and
work she wilfully disregarded that instruction.

Her defiance

persisted when the order was emphatically repeated.

Her dis-

respect and defiance took the form of insisting on and indeed
walking away from her work area to get a drink of water, and by
her statement "I have the right to get a drink of water."

I am

persuaded that that incident was a purposeful act on her part
to exhibit not only to the management personnel involved but to
other employees who were present her anger with and defiance of
managerial authority.
Had the Employer imposed the penalty of discharge I
would not have considered it proper in this case because of
mitigating circumstances within the meaning of the foregoing rule

-6I conclude the grievant had reasonable grounds to believe that
the Employer spitefully failed or delayed in giving her her
paycheck when she had requested it earlier to cash it during
lunch.

(She had applied for and had been granted the next day

off to attend a family funeral).

I think the grievant had

reason to believe that she would get the check in time to cash
it, and indeed had asked about it during the morning.

I accept

as logical and true her testimony that she needed the cash to
travel to the funeral.

The Employer has not satisfactorily

explained why it did not or could not deliver the check to her
before lunch, especially in view of the fact that it had granted
her the next day off under the bereavement provisions of the
contract.

Indeed there is some evidence in the record that

supervision was indifferent to her needs in that regard; and
did not make a good faith effort to get the check to her earlier.
(The Employer cannot, for the first time during the arbitration
hearing, attempt to justify its actions, impute further liability to the employee, or cast doubt on the bona fides of her
need for her money by a new assertion that her request for the
funeral day off was made on false grounds.)

That she did not get

the check until after lunch was provocative and it angered her
It is a mitigating factor in this case; it explains in part,
but does not excuse her insubordination.

As previously stated

her remedy was to grieve; not to engage in a course of conduct
in defiance of and disrespectful to managerial authority.

-7Accordingly though discharge would be toosevere under
the circumstances and though in my view a suspension of a lesser
period of time would have been adequate, I do not find that the
three week suspension was wrong or excessive.

Therefore that

penalty is upheld.
Grievance 74-148:

The Employer asserts that the grievant

again falsified the reason for her absence from work after the
lunch break and for the balance of the day, November 19.

How-

ever I find that allegation, as serious as it may be, to be
immaterial to the determinative facts in this case.

I reverse

the discharge on what may appear to be a technical ground; yet
I am fully satisfied it is mandated by fundamental principles
of due process.

The grievant's offense was not reporting back

to work after her lunch break

For that offense the Employer hac

predetermined the penalty and told her what it would be.

She

was informed that if she did not return to work that day from
lunch on time, or at all, she would be docked for the time lost.
In other words the Employer fixed the measure of penalty as loss
of pay, and nothing else.
The grievant had overstayed her lunch periods by
several minutes on earlier days.

For November 19 she requested

a change in her lunch period, presumably to carry out some
appointment.

It was granted.

In her discussions with super-

vision she was asked if she thought she would be late in returning and stated that if so, she would call.

-8She was not asked where she would be or what she would be
doing during the lunch break.

She was told that if she over-

stayed her lunch or did not return at all she would lose pay for
the time involved.

Clearly supervision was on notice that she

might again overstay her lunch period or might not return to
work at all that afternoon.

It could have warned her that a

failure to report back to work would result in a disciplinary
penalty (leaving the measure of discipline to later determination) or she could have been told that in light of her overall
record, a failure to return on time or at all would no longer
be tolerated and that she would be subject to dismissal.
Employer did neither.

The

It told her that her penalty would be

loss of pay.
The Employer did not limit the penalty of loss of pay
to any

specific reasons for her failure or inability to report

back to vrork.

By making it unconditional, it fashioned as the

maximum penalty, the loss of pay if she failed to return to
work for any reason.

Indeed when she called in sometime after

3 P.M. to report that she would not return that day, she was
not questioned about her whereabouts, but was again told only
that her penalty would be loss of pay.
Hence the Employer's investigation into why she did not
return to work, including whether or not she went to the
Unemployment Insurance Office and/or had boiler trouble at home

-9and whether she lied about either, was superfluous, beyond
the scope of her offense, and irrelevent to the disciplinary
penalty to be imposed.
It is a fundamental rule of due process that when a
penalty is fixed for an offense, and the offending person so
notified, the penalty imposed on that person may not be expanded or increased when and after he commits the proscribed act.
Here as I see it, the grievant's offense was her failure to return to work.

She was told what the penalty would be.

was not told that the penalty depended on why she did
return to work.

She
not

Consequently, and for purposes of penalty,

the question of why she failed to return and whether she was
truthful about it are both "after the fact" and immaterial.
This is not to say that she did not mis represent where she
was and that that would not be an offense independent of the
instant case.

Rather it is to say that the Employer cannot

rely on it here, when it fixed her penalty and put her on
notice that she would lose pay and nothing more.

Therefore

in my prior Award, and based on the grievant's overall record
before me I reduced her discharge to a disciplinary suspension
and directed that she be reinstated without back pay and with
a stern warning that future misconduct, in my opinion, would
be grounds for summary

dismissal.

The Hearing of July 2, 1975: This hearing was adjourned

-10at its outset because the grievant failed to appear.

She had

not notified the Union, the Employer or the Arbitrator that
she would not be in attendance and her whereabouts were then
unknown.

The Employer's motion that the Arbitrator's fee

and his expenses for that day including the rental of the
hearing room, be assessed against the Union, is granted.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October 6, 1975
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this sixth day of October, 1975, before
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.

me personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local32 OPEIU

INTERIM

and

AWARD
Case No. 74-408

Hospital Service Plan of New Jersey

Subject to an Opinion later and later disposition of
all other issues in the case, the discharge of Theola Hosten
is reduced to a disciplinary suspension.
instated but without back pay.

She shall be re-

The period of time between

her discharge and suspension shall be deemed a disciplinary
suspension and so noted in her employment records.

She is

warned that any future misconduct on her part would, in the
opinion of this Arbitrator, be grounds for her summary dismissal,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 26, 1975
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this twenty-sixth day of July, 1975, before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
be to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 32, Office and Professional
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO

RULING
On Grievance #74-135

and
Case #74-408
Hospital Service Plan of New Jersey

The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator under
the arbitration agreement of the above named parties and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following Ruling on Grievance #74-135:
I conclude that both sides defaulted
on the contractual time limits of Step
I of the grievance procedure.
Accordingly, grievance #74-135 is remanded
to Step I, for reprocessing within the
grievance procedure. The time limits therein shall commence to run as of Monday, May
5, 1975.

J. SchmertJ
Arbitrator
DATED: May 1, 1975
STATE OF New York)ss>.
COUNTY OF Nassau )
On this the first day of May, 1975 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the samea

? N?w
Term Expires

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN
NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
-—X

in the Matter of the Arbitration
between
STIPULATION

MID

NEW YORK CITY TAXI DRIVERS UNION,
LOCAL 3036, AFL'-CIO
AWARD

On behalf of FRANCISCO SOUFFRONT
and CARLOS SOUFFRONT
-and-

JAYLEW OPERATING CORP.
-X

The following 'stipulation was agreed upon as
a result of the hearing of the within matter on January 14,
.1975, and upon which I make my AWARD:
1.

The discharge of Francisco Souffront

and Carlos Souffront by Jaylen Operating Corp. was not for
just cause.
2.

Francisco Souffront and Carlos Souffront

agree that they will not return to work at Jaylen Operating
Corp. in consideration of the terms of this Stipulation and Award;.
3.

Francisco Souffront and Carlos Souffront

shall retain and accrue all vacation rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement as if any work that they shall perform
as a member of the bargaining unit represented by the New York
City Taxi Drivers Union, Local 3036, AFL-CIO, at any taxi
garage were performed at and for the fleet operated by Jaylen
Operating Corp.

They shall receive vacation pay from the new

Employer or Employers according to the formula prescribed by
the Collective Bargaining Agreement that is or shall be applicable at the times relevant.

I

Any difference that may exist

between the vacation pay payable by the new Employer or Employers and the pay that they would have received had all their
vacation credit been accrued at Jaylen Operating Corp. shall be
payable by Jaylen Operating Corp. or their successors, assigns,
or managing officers and/or owners.
4.

Francisco Souffront and Carlos Souffront

shall receive full credit toward their vacation rights .for the
periods of time between the dates of their respective discharges and the1 dates of their subsequent regular employment
in the taxi industry, which has commenced with their current
employment.

The said credit shall be added to their period of

service with, and shall be the sole responsibility of, Jaylen
Operating Corp.
AGREED T;
FRANCISCO SOUFFRONT

CARJfOEKSOUFFRON

DATE

r3AM

DATE

JONATHAN GOLD, EXECUTIVE
VICE PRESIDENT FOR THE EMPLOYER

EASTMAN, EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
MEMBER, FOR THE UNION

The parties may post or otherwise disseminate
this AWARD.

Dated:
STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

, 1975

EryJ u . Schraertz
Impartial Chairman

3

SS

On this 'Q day of -February, 1975, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Textile Workers Union of America
Local 630, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Johnson and Johnson Ethicon, Inc.

In accordance with Article II of the collective bargaining agreement dated June 1, 1973 between the above named Company
and Union, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Whether or not the three week suspension
imposed on Gwendolyn Pendleton is warranted.
If not what shall be the remedy?
The hearing was held at the Company plant in North
Brunswick, New Jersey on December 2, 1974 at which time Mrs.
Pendleton, hereinafter referred to as the grievant, and representatives of the Union and Company appeared. All concerned
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
The grievant was suspended for three weeks under Article
XIII Section H of the contract which reads:
Any employee who is absent from work for
three (3) days or more consecutively without permission or without properly notifying the Employer shall be deemed to have
quit his job voluntarily.

-2The Company claims that the grievant overstayed a
medical leave of absence for more than three consecutive days
without permission or proper notice.

It asserts that inasmuch

as the foregoing contract section permits the Company to
terminate an offending employee, the lesser penalty of three
weeks suspension is encompassed therein and proper.
The parties agree that the foregoing contract clause
is applicable to leaves of absences including medical leaves.
The grievant was granted a medical leave of absence from
January 7 through January 21, 1974.

The leave was thereafter

extended at the grievant"s request through February 4; and
again extended on the same basis through February 18, 1974.
Written confirmation of the last extension, which the grievant
acknowledges she received, explicitly informed her that
"failure to return to work by the expiration date of any medical
leave will result in removal of your name from the Johnson and
Johnson seniority rolls."

The grievant did not return to work

on February 18 nor within the three consecutive days thereafter
as required by Article XIII Section H.

Consequently, by letter

dated February 20, 1974 she was notified of her "release from
the Company."

Thereafter the Company changed the penalty to

a suspension of three weeks.
Neither the grievant nor the Union on her behalf assert
that she was unfamiliar with the leave of absence procedure,
specifically the requirement to explicitly request extensions

-3or at least notify the Company when a return to employment
upon the expiration date of the leave was not to take place.
Rather, the grievant and the Union on her behalf, contend that
the Company was properly notified within the meaning of Section
H.

And, alternatively in any event, inasmuch as she remained

under a physician's care during the period subsequent to the
end of her leave of absence, she should be excused from any
liability under Section H.
Clearly, under Section H the burden is on an employee
to request and obtain permission for an extension of any leave
of absence or at least minimially to properly notify the
Company of the fact and reasons for an inability to return to
work when scheduled to do so.

As previously mentioned the

grievant was fully familiar with this procedure, no simply because
she had requested and received two extensions of the instant
leave of absence, but over the years had applied for and received
a series of leaves of absence and extensions, primarily for
medical reasons.

Here the facts are disputed as to whether the

grievant notified the Company that she would be unable to return
to work on or at least within three consecutive days following
February 18th.

She testified that she asked her daughter to

call and so notify the Company and that her daughter informed
her that the call was made on February 18th and the infb rmation
given to a nurse on duty in the Company's medical department.

-4The Company offered testimony and documents in support of its
contention that there is no record of any such call by the
grievant's daughter or anyone else on her behalf.

As the burden

under Section H is on the employee to seek extensions or to
notify the Company when extensions are needed, it follows that
the burden also is on any employee to establish that any such
notice was given.

The grievant has not met this burden.

She

concedes she was not at home when her leave of absence expired,
but rather had traveled to Florida sometime earlier because of
what she asserts was a "family emergency" (she testified that
a newly born grandchild there was ill, there was some question
about his survival and she went to visit).

Even assuming the

bona fides of the reason for her trip to Florida, it is manifest
that she had plenty of time between the time she left New Jersey
and the date her leave expired to properly notify the Company
that additional time might be necessary and to request an
extension of her medical leave.
no effort to do so herself.

Yet she concedes that she made

Her testimony that she asked her

daughter to make the call and that her daughter did so is not
sufficiently probative to meet the burden under Section H.

Her

daughter neither appeared at nor testified at this arbitration
hearing, so that whether or not the call was made remains a matter
of conjecture, especially in the face of Company records which
indicate that no such call was received.

In short, the grievant

had a duty to notify the Company herself in the proper and prescribed manner and had adequate time to do so despite the
reasons for her trip to Florida, even assuming the legitimacy

-5of that trip while on a medical leave of absence.

Accordingly

the grievant was absent from work for three or more consecutive
days without permission and without properly notifying the Company
within the meaning of Section H.
The Union's alternative argument, namely that the
grievant should be excused because she was still under medical
treatment subsequent to the expiration of her leave has been
dealt with, in my judgement, by the Company's mitigation of the
penalty from termination to a three week suspension.

Though the

Company expressed in this proceeding its skepticism about the
legitimacy of the grievant's Florida trip while on a medical
leave of absence, I am satisfied that by imposing a three week
suspension rather than deeming the grievant's failure to comply
with Section H as a "voluntary quit" or grounds for termination,
it afforded her the benefit of the doubt.

And thereby reduced her

liability under Section H to a level which I deem to be adequately
responsive to and dispositive of the Union's alternative argument
herein.

In other words, though Section H was not complied with

and for which dismissal would be proper, circumstances were
such (apparently in the Company's view and perhaps as a consequenc
of the Union's intervention on the grievant's behalf) to justify
some penalty, but not the ultimate allowable penalty under Section
H.
Therefore, considering all the foregoing I do not find the
imposition of a three week suspension for a contract violation,
the unconditional terms of which would justify dismissal, to be
unreasonable or unwarranted.

-6The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator
under the arbitration agreement between the above named
parties dated June 1, 1973 and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of said parties makes the following AWARD:
The three week suspension imposed on
Gwendolyn Pendleton was warranted.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitration
DATED: December 30, 1974
STATE OF: New York )sg .
COUNTY OF: New York )
On this thirtieth day of December, 1974, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

Case No. 1830 0307 74S

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 343, Hotel and Restaurant
Employees and Bar Tenders Union,
AFL-CIO

AWARD

and
Laurels Hotel and Country Club

Based on the evidence submitted at the duly noticed and
scheduled hearing of April 10, 1975, the Undersigned duly
designated as the Arbitrator under the arbitration agreement
between the above named Union and Employer makes the following
AWARD:
For the period July through October,
1974 Laurels Hotel and Country Club
is delinquent in payment to and owes
the Health and Welfare Security Fund
of Local 343 the sum of ONE THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS AND NO CENTS
($1,200.00).
Laurels Hotel and Country Club is
directed to pay such sum to said Fund
forthwith with interest at 6% per annum.
The Arbitrator's fee of $250 shall be
shared equally by the Union and the
Employer. Therefore Laurels Hotel and
Country Club shall pay to the Union the
sum of $125. representing the Employer's
share of the Arbitrator's fee, previously
advanced by the Union.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 11, 1975
COUNTY OF New York )c c •
STATE OF New York
) '
On this eleventh day of April, 1975, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me knovn and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
OPINION
United Transportation Union
AND
and
AWARD
The Long Island Railroad Company
Case #13339 1470 74
The issue is:
Whether Conductor R. Sunderman was unjustly disciplined; and if so to what
remedy is he entitled?
A hearing was held at the American Arbitration Association on January 8, 1975 at which time representatives of the
above named Union and Employer appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
Mr. Sunderman, hereinafter referred to as the grievant,
was disciplined for failure to complay with Rule 670 of the
Rules of the Operating Department, in that he "permitted his
train to stop within the (Harold) Interlocking and then proceed
east without proper signal authority."
The Union concedes the Rule violation.

It does not

dispute the Employer's charge that the grievant permitted his
train to proceed without observing the proper signal.

The

thrust of the Union's case herein is that the penalty imposed
on the grievant, a twenty day suspension, is too severe and
should be reduced.

The Union explains that the grievant should be

excused from such a severe penalty because at the time he was

-2to observe the signal he was occupied in instructing and observing the work of a new brakeman, so that this new employee would
not endanger himself in carrying out the train's maneuver.

And

also that the train was stopped just below the signal so that
it could not be directly observed by the grievant from his
location.
Considering the manifest importance of this particular
signal to operating safety, I cannot accept these explanations
as mitigating excuses.

A failure to observe and comply with thi

particular signal means, as it did here, that the train proceeded through the Interlocking onto a easterly track blind, without certainty or knowledge that the track was clear and that
another train was not approaching in the opposite direction on
the same single track.

In short, as I understand it, this

particular signal prevents head-on collisions of trains moving
in opposite directions.

That the grievant's train did not carry

passengers, was operated at night and that an accident did not
result are immaterial to the grievant's unconditional
responsibility under the Rule.
Under the circumstances I am not prepared to conclude
that a suspension of twenty days is too severe, especially where,
as here, that period of suspension though so recorded on the
grievant's record, involved a loss of only six days pay.

-3-

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in
the above matter, and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties
makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the disciplinary
penalty imposed on Conductor R. Sunderman.

Eric y. Schmertz

DATED: January 20, 1975
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twentieth day of January, 1975, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Transportation Union

OPINION AND AWARD
Docket 75-1
Case No. 3
AAA Case No. 1339-1470-74

and
Long Island Railroad Company

The issue is the propriety of the discharge of Trainman
Lawrence Driscoll.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on March 24, 1975 at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared.
I find material fault on both sides.

Therefore I reduce

the discharge of Mr. Driscoll, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant", to a disciplinary suspension.

Provided he is found

by the Employer's medical department to be physically and
mentally fit, he shall be restored to duty without back pay.
There is no question but that the grievant acted irresponsibly, and by his own failings initiated the chain of events leading to his discharge.

He failed to report for work on November

4, 1974 and was not heard from again until after his dismissal
following a Trial held in his absence on December 10, 1974.
Through the Union he asserts that he called in ill on November 3.

-2-

But the Employer has no record of that call, and there is no
substantiation

in support of the grievant's assertion in the

record before me.

Even assuming the veracity of that assertion,

the grievant nonetheless had' the clear duty subsequent to
November 3 to keep the Employer informed of his status, condition
and location.

An employee who absents himself from work, even

if ill, cannot assume that for more than one month thereafter
the Employer may not have reason to contact him, to know of
his current condition and his whereabouts.

Under that circum-

stance the employee has the duty to communicate with the
Employer at reasonable times.
duty.

The grievant did! not meet this

More specifically, I find that the grievant should have

known that he had this duty because, he had been informed,
earlier in October, 1974, that the Employer was not satisfied
with the post office address he gave as his "residence" and
that a better address was needed.

So he was on express notice

that the Employer wanted current and accurate information as to
his whereabouts when off the job and should have kept the
Employer informed of his whereabouts especially because, as he
avers, he was "transient".

The grievant's bare and unsubstantiated

assertion in the record below that he reported off the job sick
and his failure to be mindful of the Employer's request and
need for a more definitive address at which he lived or resided,
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constitute failings by which the grievant initially and solely
put himself in an adverse position subject to disciplinary
action.
The situation became compounded not simply by his failure
to report to work for training for a conductor promotion on
November 4, 1974, but his failure thereafter to respond to a
"ten day letter" sent on November 9, by certified mail to his
last known address, and his failure thereafter to respond to
notice of Trial, which was held on December 10, 1974.
The Employer argues that it made every good faith effort
to contact the grievant with regard to each of the foregoing,
by not only sending certified notices to the last known residence
which he gave to the Employer in October, but also by dispatching a representative to that address to see if the grievant could
be found.

The Employer points out that each letter was returned

by the Post Office with notations that the grievant had moved
and left no forwarding address.
residence reported similarly.

The official who visited the

Also efforts to telephone the

grievant, utilizing the phone number which he had previously
given, proved unavailing because the number had been disconnected.
On the face this would appear as full compliance by the
Employer with any good faith obligation to seek out the grievant;
to give him notice that he was AWOL and subject to a disciplinary
trial.

Yet an examination of the record before me discloses that

the Employer had another address which the grievant had previously
indicated would be the better one through which he could be

-4reached, and which,

though a post office box number that did

not meet the Employer's requirement for a "residence", could
have been used by the Employer in conjunction with or subsequent
to notices to the grievant's last known residence, if a complete
effort to locate the grievant was to be undertaken.

This is not

to say that the Employer must accept a post office box number in
lieu of a definitive residence, but rather that in the instant
case, where the Employer apparently was anxious to find the
grievant, to give him notice of

his AWOL status and impending

Trial I fail to see why it did not make use of the post office
box number as well.
nor unreasonable.

To do so would have been neither burdensome
The record before me indicates that on an

earlier occasion, in September, 1974, in connection with notice
to the grievant to report to the Employer following his failure
to respond to notice to take a medical examination, the Employer
sent the letter to the post office box; the grievant received it
and responded satisfactorily.

In short had the Employer in

November attempted to communicate with the grievant through the
post office box number which the grievant had earlier indicated
was his"better address" because he was at the time transient and
living with various friends, this case may not have reached as
serious a stage as it did.

The grievant's AWOL status on and

shortly after November 4, 1974 would have been made known to him;
he could have then responded by attempting to substantiate his
assertion that he called in sick on November 3; he could have

-5reported for work or confirmed his continued illness, and his
disciplinary Trial might have been obviated.
Considering all the foregoing a disciplinary penalty is
warranted, but short of discharge.

The record is unclear as to

the grievant's present physical and mental condition.

Though he

was certified as fit for work by the Employer in October, his
earlier history of difficulties suggest that on and after
November 4 certain physical and/or mental conditions may have
reoccurred which not only then impeded his ability to work but
which may still be present.

I do not accept the Union's

contention, based on certification by the grievant's physician
that he was and is fit to return to work since the end of
December, 1974.

Instead the grievant's present medical condition

shall be ascertained by the Employer.
reinstated but without back pay.

If found fit he shall be

The period of time between the

date of his discharge and his reinstatement shall be deemed a
disciplinary suspension and so noted in his employment record.
The Undersigned having been duly designated as the
Arbitrator under the Arbitration Agreement between the above
i
named parties, and having been duly sworn and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the following
AWARD:
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The discharge of Lawrence Driscoll
is reduced to a disciplinary suspension,
If found fit for duty by the Employer's
Medical Department Driscoll shall be reinstated but without back pay.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 7, 1975
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)
On this seventh day of April, 1975, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Transportation

Union

AWARD
Case #1339-1291 75

and

Long Island Railroad

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the contract between the above named parties the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide certain disputes relating to "run failures."
The hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on September 10, 1975 at which time representatives of the above named parties and the employees involved
in the "run failures" appeared, All concerned were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
There is no dispute that each of the affected employees
missed or failed to cover the specific
charged by the carrier.

assignment or run as

What is in question in whether they

were justified or have an acceptable excuse.
Having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the parties I render the following AWARDS:
A. J. Melleby does not have an acceptable
excuse for his third run failure on August
7, 1975. The third run failure violation
is sustained.

-2The burden of establishing justification or
an acceptable excuse for an otherwise undisputed run failure, is on the employee. Here,
particularly after two previous run failures
the burden was on the employee to establish
that he was ill as he alleges. He has not done
so to my satisfaction. He did not seek or obtain
medical attention; nor did he ask either his wife
or his brother-in-law who were in the house with
him at the time to notify the carrier of his
illness at the time it occurred; nor did either
of those persons testify in this proceeding to
corroborate his story.
W. C. Robinson has an acceptable excuse for
his third run failure on July 25, 1975, but
does not have an acceptable excuse for his
fourth run failure on July 26, 1975. Accordingly the third run failure charge is reversed
and the fourth run failure charge (which per
force becomes a third run failure for disciplinary
purposes) is sustained.
I accept the employee's testimony and the documentary evidence that he experienced car trouble on
July 25, 1975 when he started out to work. I
accept his statement that his battery was dead and
his evidence that he purchased a new battery that
very day. I believe he had no prior warning that
the battery was weak or dead. I am satisfied that
his car trouble in that regard was unforseen, and
but for that difficulty had allowed himself enough
time to drive to work.
However with regard to the next day the employee
has not established that he was sick as he alleges.
I find no reason why the carrier's investigator
would falsely testify about the lack of bona fides
of the doctors' notes which the employee presented.
Additionally, though the employee spent a considerable amount of time allegedly going to a hospital
and then to the offices of two doctors he did not
at any time call to notify the carrier of his
condition or that he had missed his run. His
failure to do so casts additional doubt on the validity
of his defense.

-3J. R. Knight has acceptable excuses for his
third and fourth run failures of July 28 and
August 1, 1975. Accordingly both run failure
violations are reversed.
Both run failures were due to car trouble.
Here the employee has not only proved to my
satisfaction that his car was inoperative,
but established that he made a determined
effort to have his car repaired; had reason
to believe each time he took it in for repairs
that the difficulties were corrected; and on
both July 28 and August 1st had reason to believe
that his car was operative and could get him from
his home to Babylon where he was to take a train
to New York to meet his run. It is undisputed
that the employee allowed sufficient time to drive
from his home to Babylon and that but for the
difficulties with his car, which he reasonably
believed on both occasions had been corrected,
would not have been late for or missed his run.
While it can be argued that the employee was less
than diligent on August 1st, when, upon discovering car trouble again, he made no effort to obtain
alternate transportation to Babylon even though he
had two hours to do so. However I am going to give
him the benefit of the doubt and excuse him on that
occasion as well because I believe he was so exasperated and frustrated over the continued car trouble
despite his efforts and the costs incurred to have
it repaired that he should be excused from a normal
obligation to calmly and objectively attempt to obtain alternate transportation to work. To his
credit he called the carrier and reported his predicament. He frankly sought to avoid a run failure
violation. He asked for the day off or a "personal
day off" but was denied both. He then requested
that he be marked ill. His unrefuted testimony is
that the dispatcher stated "he could go off sick."
This is not to say that the dispatcher excused him
from the run failure but rather that under the circumstances the employee had reason to believe that
"sickness" was substituted for a "run failure" and
that he would lose two days pay which is mandatorily
attendant to reporting off sick, rather than suffer
a fourth run failure violation.
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L. Furia does not have an acceptable excuse
for his third run failure of June 24, 1975.
That run failure violation is sustained.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 18, 1975
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF Nassau )
On this eighteenth day of September, 1975, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowled to me that
he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 1251, U.A.W.
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1230 0197 74

Mattatuck Manufacturing Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did Paul Varlese receive the correct
amount of vacation pay in 1974 in
accordance with Article IX of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement? If
not what should the remedy be?
A hearing was held in Waterbury, Connecticut on June
24, 1975 at which time Mr. Varlese hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" and representatives of the Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
Article IX (effective July 1, 1973) reads:
A. An employee with three (3) months but less
than one (1) year of seniority will not be entitled to vacation time off until June 1 of the
vacation year. These employees' vacation pays
will be computed from June 1 to May 31 of the
preceding year. Vacation pays for all other
employees will be computed from their W-2 form
as follows:
(1) Employees with three months, but less than
one year of seniority, will be entitled to
vacation pay of 2% of their gross earnings during the prior year.
(2) Employees with one year, but less than two
years of seniority, will be entitled to a vacation of 2.4% of their gross earnings during the
prior year.

-2(3) Employees with two years, but less
than three years of seniority, will be
entitled to a vacation pay of 2.8% of
their gross earnings during the prior
year.
(4) Employees with three years but less
than five years will be entitled to a
vacation of 2 weeks at 5% of their gross
earnings during the prior year, effective
on the anniversary date of hiring.
(5) Employees with six years but less than
ten years will be entitled to a vacation
of 2 weeks at 5%% of their gross earnings
during the prior year effective on the
anniversary date of hiring.
(6) Employees with ten years but less than
fifteen years will be entitled to a vacation
of 3 weeks at 770 of their gross earnings during the prior year, effective on the anniversary
date of hiring.
(7) Employees with fifteen years but less
than twenty years will be entitled to a
vacation of 4 weeks at 870 of their gross
earnings during the prior year, effective
on the anniversary date of hiring.
(8) Employees with twenty years or more seniority will be entitled to a vacation of 4 weeks
at 97o of their gross earnings during the prior
year, effective on the anniversary date of
hiring.
On November 4, 1974 the grievant reached his twentieth
year of service with the Company.

Prior to that date, during

August, 1974 and during the contractual vacation year (January
1 to December 31) he took a four week vacation for which he was
paid "8 percent of his gross earnings during the prior year."
It is the Union's contention that effective November 4, 1974
he should receive an additional one percent of gross earnings
as vacation pay for the year 1974 applied retroactively to cover
the four weeks of vacation taken in August.

In short the Union
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interprets the contract to mean that an employee who reaches
his twentieth year of seniority during the 1974 vacation year
is entitled to 9 percent rather than 8 percent of gross earnings
as vacation pay for his 1974 vacation regardless of when during
the year he takes his vacation, and even if, as here, the full
vacation was taken prior to the anniversary date of the twentieth
year of service.
In support of its position the Union asserts that its
interpretation of the foregoing contract provision was agreed
to in bargaining between the parties when the current contract
was negotiated; that the Company settled prior similar grievances
or granted vacation pay consistent with the Union's position
herein; that the phrase "effective on the anniversary date of
hiring" found at the end of those paragraphs of Article IX which
set forth the vacation entitlement of employees with three, six,
ten, fifteen, and twenty years of service, means and was intended
to accord the higher rate of vacation pay to an employee who
moved from one of those seniority levels to the next irrespective
of when during that year he took his vacation.
The Company denies that during the course of the negotiations it agreed to the Union's interpretation of the pertinent parts of Article IX, and argues that if Union representatives reported any such agreement to the membership that report
was both erroneous and self serving; that other than in two
cases (one which was an error and the other a settlement without
precedent) the consistent pratice has been to pay vacation pay
at the percentage of gross earnings applicable to an employee's

-4seniority at the time the vacation is taken.

Therefore in the

instant case, because the grievant was still an employee with
fifteen years service in August, 1974 when he took his full
four week vacation he was paid at the rate of 8 percent.

Had

he waited, the Company points out, until after November 4, 1974
he would have been paid for his vacation at the rate which obtained for an employee with twenty years service, namely at 9
percent.

Further, by example, the Company claims that where an

employee who moves from one of the aforementioned seniority
levels to the next within the vacation year and takes a part of
his vacation prior to that point of transition and the balance
of his vacation thereafter, he has been paid at the lower rate
for the first part of his vacation and at the higher rate for
the balance of his vacation.
Despite the contentions of the parties that the contract
language clearly supports their respective but divergent
positions, I find that language to be unclear and ambiguous.
The question simply is whether there is a significant substantive difference between employees with three through twenty
years of service (i.e. the foregoing seniority steps of three
years, six years, ten years, fifteen years and twenty years) and
those employees covered under Article IX with three months, one
year and two years of service.

As to the latter group there is

no dispute between the parties that the Company's interpretation
of the contract, is correct.

The Union concedes that an

employee who takes a vacation at the time his seniority is at
least three months, but less than one year would receive vacation pay at the rate of 2 percent, and would not thereafter,

-5upon achieving one year of seniority receive an additional .4
percent vacation pay applied retroactively to the actual vacation
he took earlier.

And similarly employees who take their vaca-

tions after one year of work but less than two would receive
vacation pay at the rate of 2.4 percent and would receive no
additional vacation pay thereafter, when during the year they
moved to the two year level.

The difference which the Union

relies upon is that unlike that junior group, and beginning with
three years of service the contract language includes the concluding phrase "effective on the anniversary date of hire."
I do not find that this additional language is either clarifying or by its own terms subject to a single interpretation.

It

could well mean, as the Union asserts, that the new vacation pay
rate is to be paid throughout the vacation year retroactively
as well as prospectively whenever an employee during that vacation
year progresses from one of the covered seniority levels to the
next.

Under that interpretation an employee, like the grievant,

would be entitled to the additional percentage of vacation pay,
applied to whenever he took his vacation during that year.

On

the other hand the phrase could mean, with equal logic, that the
increase in the rate of vacation pay becomes effective and is
payable only on and after the anniversary date of an employee's
movement from one specified seniority level to the next.

In that

case the grievant would not be entitled to additional vacation
pay because the anniversary date of his movement from fifteen to
twenty years of seniority was subsequent to when he took his
vacation in the year 1974.

Also, as the Union argues, that the

disputed phrase ("effective on the anniversary date of hiring")
is found in Article IX as obtain-

-6ing to employees with three, six, ten, fifteen and twenty
years of seniority but not to those with three months, one
year and two years of seniority may mandate a different
application of vacation pay for the two delineated groups.

Or,

as the Company contends may be nothing more than an express
recitation of what obviously is or would be implied throughout
Article IX in order to give it its logical, traditional and
hence proper meaning.

Again, in short, the inclusion of the

disputed phrase in one part of Article IX but not in another,
could mean

either that the two parts should be interpretated

differently, or that the latter section, which includes the
clause, was simply more explicit as to what was intended through
out.

For these reasons Article IX is neither clear nor devoid

of ambiguities, and cannot by its own terms be interpreted
conclusively one way or the other.
Where critical contract language is

ambiguous the

traditional approach is for the arbitrator to look to what
transpired at negotiations leading to the disputed contract
clause, and at

past practice to determine what was agreed to

and how the parties have intended that clause to apply.
fortunately in the instance case neither are helpful.

Un-

The

evidence and testimony surrounding the negotiation of the clause
is sharply conflicting and offsetting.

The "past practices"

upon which both sides rely do not constitute evidentiary past
practice within the traditional meaning of that phrase.

The

Union relies on two prior cases in support of its interpretation

-7of Article IX,

Two examples do not make a past practice,

especially where one of them (the Hunihan grievance) was
expressly settled with the statement that "under No condition
will we extend this consideration to any other employee", or
in other words, without precedent.

The remaining example,

the Mancini case, was, claims the Company, simply an error.
Whether error or not a single payment at the higher rate does
not meet the requirements of a past practice.
On the other hand the Company's evidence of past
practice is also indeterminative.

The list of employees who

were paid for their vacations at the rate applicable to their
seniority at the time the vacation was taken, turned out to be
confined to employees with three months, one year, two years
but less than three years seniority, and there is no dispute
that employees at those levels do not fall within the Union's
claim in this case.

Offsetting the Mancini payment is the

settlement of the DeMano grievance.

There the parties stipu-

lated "On anniversary date of employee, Company will always
pay remainder of vacation time to the new percentage."

If as

it reads, the new percentage was applicable only to the remainder of vacation time that settlement is supportive of the
Company's assertion that the higher percentage is only paid
prospectively to any remaining vacation time after the anniversary
date, but has no retroactive effect.
So the evidence on the negotiation of the clause is
inconclusive; what prior cases there have been are irrelevant

-8or inconsistent, and as to the latter, of insufficient quantity
and duration to meet the minimum requisites of a "past practice.
It is well settled where the contract language is unclear and ambiguous, where clarification cannot be obtained
from the contract negotiations leading to that disputed language,
and where there is no past practice or an inconclusive past
practice,the Union (and its grievance) does not meet the
burden of establishing a right under contract, and must fail.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator under the arbitration agreement dated July 1, 1972
as extended, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Paul Varlese received the correct
amount of vacation pay in 1974 in
accordance with Article IX of the
collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 15, 1975
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ss " :
On this fifteenth day of July, 1975 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
INSURANCE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL
UNION, AFL-CIO
and

AWARD

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Case Number : 16 30 0047 74

The undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named parties and dated 1972-1975, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
Awards as follows:

The dispute is arbitrable.

The

Company did not violate the contract
by awarding the commission involved
to District Sales Manager Windsor.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November

U

1974

DATED:
STATE OF: New York)gs
COUNTY OF:New York) '

On this
day of November, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz, to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
- - - - - - - - - - - - x
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
INSURANCE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL
UNION, AFL-CIO
and '

•

:
.

• 0 P "I N I 0 N

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Case Number: 16 30 0047 74
:

In accordance with Article VIII of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement dated 1972-1975, between Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company and Insurance Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
"Whether the Company violated the
contract in awarding the commission
involved to District Sales Manager
Windsor, with the stipulation or
statement by the Arbitrator that
'the Company is alleging, also, at
the threshold, that the dispute
is not arbitrable, and the rights
cf the parties on that phase of the
dispute reserved, and may be presented fully and in their entirety
to me."
A hearing was held in Baltimore, Maryland, on July 9,
1974.

The parties were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

Both parties submitted post-hearing briefs.

Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO
(the Union), is the collective bargaining representative
of "Regular, Office Account and canvassing Agents" of
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (the Company), in
various jurisdictions including the state of Maryland.
The representation status of the Union as defined in
Article I ("Union Recognition") of the agreement, specifically excludes District Sales Managers, Sales Managers
and Sales Representatives, among others.
The Union alleges and the Company concedes that
on August 24, 1973, District Sales Manager (Belmar District) Windsor wrote, and thereafter received commissions
-

for, conversions from group insurance to individual policies insuring the lives of Charles Kelly, Sr,, and John Kelly. •
The Union maintains that the commissions for these conversions should have been paid to Agent Jerome Fried, the
grievant, rather than to District Manager Windsor.
support of this contention, the Union shows:
1.

that Charles Kelly, Sr., and John Kelly
(the Insureds) reside in the Guilford
District, the Agency in which Fried
serves, rather than in the Belmar District where Windsor is in charge;

In

. •

2.

that Agent Fried had insurance in
force on members of the families of
the Insureds although he had never
done any business with either
Charles Kelly, Sr., or John Kelly
directly.

The Union cites the following contract provisions
and sections of Company directives, all of which were in
evidence herein, in support of the claim that commissions
on the conversions were payable to Agent Fried:
Agreement, Article XIII (Compensation)
"1.

Subject to approval of the necessary
governmental authorities, during the
term of this Agreement, the rates of
commission, other forms of compensation,
and methods of determining compensation
shall be set forth in Schedules I through
VIII in Appendix B hereof subject to
revisions of the rules and regulations of
the Company made to effectuate the compensation changes contained in Appendix
B, provided that such revisions shall
not violate the express provisions of
this-Agreement . . . "
Agreement, Schedule I
(as referred to in Article XIII)

"

First-Year Commissions - All Agents
The commission rates set forth in this
Schedule are payable on policies and
contracts with issue dates on and after
January 1, 1973, except as otherwise
specified.
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"A - PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE PREMIUM NOTICE POLICIES
Percent of First Policy Year Premiujns:
Other than
** Executive
Kind of Policy
Executive Equity
Equity
CONVERSIONS FROM GROUP
(Including Wholesale) and
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN
To Single Premium Policies. . 1.0
To All Others
.7.5
Field Management Procedural Change (9/8/72)
New Business Leads
it
To District Sales Management and Branch Management
"The following procedures (effective immediately) have
been established for the handling and assigning of new
business leads that are referred to a District or
Branch Office.
"When a new business lead is received at the Public Window
or by telephone, the Clerk should establish whether the
person has any preference for a particular representative.
If no preference is given, the Clerk should establish, in
conversation with the prospect, whether there is any
present Metropolitan business in the family and, if there
is, ask the prospect if he knows the name of the representative (arid, if necessary, the agency number and District)
who services his business.
"If identification is obtained, the lead is to be referred
to the servicing representative. If the individual is in
another Office, the request is to be referred to that
Office. If no identification of a representative is obtained in the discussion with the prospect,, the lead is to
be referred to the District Sales Manager or Branch Manager.
It is not necessary for the Clerk to refer to any Office
recordsto determine the servicing representative.
"The same procedures are to be followed by any Sales Manager
who receives a lead as a result of a telephone call or
visit by a prospect who is referred to him by a Clerk.

"

"The District Sales Manager or Branch Manager should give
any lead that is referred to him, to a highly qualified
representative (other than a member of Management) and
should rotate such leads among his sales staff as much
as possible.
"All referred leads received from the Home Office in conjunction with a sales support program or for any other
reason, or any leads received in the District or Branch
Office by mail where a particular representative is not
identified, are to be given to the District Sales Manager
or Branch Manager for distribution in the same manner
described above.
"Appropriate revisions will be made in the manuals of
instruction, and in the instructions for the Service
Call Memorandum, Form 2297, at next reprint. Please
have your Office Supervisor review and discuss this new
procedure with the Clerks in your Office."
Supplemental Rules for District Management
Clause 50-E
"B. DUTIES - A District Manager is responsible for the
supervision and training of the personnel in his District.
An Agency (M.I.C.) Manager is to aid his District Manager
as he may be directed. The duties of each are as defined
in their respective appointments, as described in this
Manual, and as embodied in instructions from the Officers
of the Compahy. District Managers and Agency (M.I.C.)
Managers are to have no business connection with any other
insurance company, business organization, firm, or other
person.
"Successful management of the Company's business in a District involves proper training and supervision of the
District personnel, establishment and maintenance of good
•will twoard the Company through service to policyholders
and the public generally, procurement of applications for
new business on desirable risks, conservation of the business presently in force, maintenance of friendly relations
with representatives of competing companies, prompt receipt
and remittance of premiums and other amounts due the
Company, avoidance of deficiencies or practices harmful to
the reputation of the Company or any of its employees and
Agents, and careful safeguarding of the interests of the
Company and its representatives.

"The Management may not be deemed satisfactory, even though
the production record of the District may be good, if the
Agents are not adequately and properly trained to carry on
effectively their various duties, or if the accounts of
the Agents show deficiencies, high arrears, disproportionate lapses, low receipt of premium payments, or if there is
a high ratio of controllable terminations.
"District Managers and Agency (M.I.C.) Managers are permitted
to write business to their own credit; however, as a part of
Management they are to restrict their selling to persons who
are not under canvass by any other Metropolitan representative.
Also, because of the information they have with respect to
the prospecting and sales activities of the Agents in their
Districts, care should be taken to avoid situations which
would place them in conflict with the sales efforts of their
Agents. Therefore, any personal insurance written by a
District Manager or Agency (M.I.C.) Manager on an individual
who has other Metropolitan insurance in force in an Agency
in the same District is to be written to the credit of the
Agent assigned to that Agency if:
(1) Any of the Metropolitan insurance already in force on
the life proposed was written by that Agent within
the past two years, or
(2) The Agent can show reasonable evidence of having canvassed such person or having serviced his insurance
within the 12 months preceding the date of application.
"Recognized forms of Business insurance or business written
with corporate or business beneficiaries, or Business
insurance written to cover Federal estate taxes, and
identified as such, may be written to the credit of the
District Manager or Agency (M.I.C.) Manager at any time
wherever it is evident that the Agent has not attempted
to sell the applicant such forms of insurance
The Company argues that because this is a dispute
relating to "District practices and administration" the
matter falls within the purview of Article VII of the Agreement and is consequently not arbitrable.

Article VII reads,

in pertinent part, as follows:

•

"ARTICLE VII - COMPLAINT PROCEDURE
The term 'complaint' as used herein shall mean disputes
or difficulties concerning District practices and
administration, affecting an Agent or group of Agents,
which do not constitute a grievance as defined in
Article VIII. However, disputas involving the application of general Company rules or amendments as
issued by the Home Office shall be processed as grievances under Article VIII.

"5.

No complaint may be referred to or become the subject
matter of arbitration except that the arbitrator
shall not be precluded, without limitation on any
other methods for such determination, from determining whether a dispute constitutes a 'grievance' or
'complaint' within the meaning of this article."
In the alternative, the Company maintains that if

it is found on the threshold issue stated above, that the
matter is arbitrable, the grievance.must be denied because
no violation of the Agreement has been shown as required
by Article VIII of the Agreement which reads in pertinent
part as follows:
"ARTICLE VIII - GRIEVANCE MACHINERY AND ARBITRATION
"The following procedure is established for presentation by
the Union of grievances and for the consideration thereofc
"Definition

of Grievance

"The term grievance as used herein shall mean disputes arising over the interpretation or application of any of the
provisions of this collective agreement, including disputes
arising over the termination of the employment of an Agent.

"Limitations on Arbitration
"With respect to arbitration, it is mutually understood
and agreed that it is not the intention of. the parties
to submit to arbitration, either directly or collaterally,
the validity or reasonableness of the Company's rules and
regulations except as otherwise provided in Article XVI.
It is expressly understood and agraed by the Union that
the Company has the sole right to direct and control its
Agents, including the exclusive right to hire, transfer,
promote, demote or to terminate the employment of any
Agent, subject only.to the provisions of this Agreement.
"It is further understood and agreed that the Company's
rights with respect to the handling and disposition of
Agencies, as well as the Company's underwriting rules,
the methods of handling and treating applications and
policies, the collection and receipt of premiums, and
all matters related thereto, and all other general management questions, as well as the revision, substitution, and
amendment of any and all agency agreements and commission
rates in any manner not contrary to this Agreement, are
matters to which the arbitration procedure provided for
above is not applicable.
"Both parties agree to be bound by the Arbitrator's lawful
award; further, they both agree that arbitration is and
shall be in lieu of any and all other remedies available
to the Union under the collective agreement, and that the
arbitration of an issue shall constitute a final disposition of the matter."
As to the issue of arbitrability, I find that
the Union alleges a violation of Article XIII of the Agreement which deals with Compensation, refers to Compensation
for conversations of group insurance, and is based, in part
and by reference, upon Rules and Regulations of the Company.
Without reaching the questions raised by the Union with
regard to the applicability

of the findings in the Nullmeyer

Arbitration Opinion or the alleged past practice of the
parties as to initiating challenges to arbitrability, I find

that the underlying dispute as to payment of commissions
finds sufficient basis in the Agreement and Company Rules
and Regulations to warrant arbitration thereof.

This

finding is, of course, based solely upon the Union's
invocation of specific Agreement provisions and Company
Rules and Regulations which, on their face, relate to
the subject matter of the underlying dispute and which
allegedly have been violated; it does not reflect any
further examination of the facts of the case nor interpretation of the cited sections of the Agreement or of
Company Rules and Regulations.
Having determined that the matter is arbitrable,
an examination of the facts of the case is now appropriate.
The following recital consists of a statement of those
facts in evidence which I find to be relevant as well as
findings of fact as to matters of fact in dispute.
Charles Kelly, Sr., and John Kelly were President
and Vice-President, respectively, of Kelly-Hanley Pontiac,
Inc.. a Baltimore automobile dealership, which maintained
a Group Life insurance plan under a General Motors Corporation agreement with the Company.

In February or March,

1973, at the Orchard Inn, Charles Kelly, Sr, ., approached
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District Manager Windsor, whom he had known approximately
twenty-three years, informed him of the impending termination of the automobile dealership, and told him that he
wished to consult with him regarding conversion of the
group insurance to individual coverage.

In this and two

subsequent conversations, on June 4 and June 27, 1973,
both of which took place in the same restaurant, and both
at Mr. Kelly's initiative, Mr. Windsor discussed with
Mr. Kelly the conversion of the group insurance and agreed
to assist in the matter.

On July 20, Charles Kelly, Sr.,

telephoned Mr. Windsor, told him that he and his brother,
John, wished to meet with him to discuss the conversion,
and the three men met later that day and discussed the
matter.

In the course of that meeting, Mr. Windsor advised

the Messrs. Kelly as to the costs of conversion, cash values
of the individual policies, the relative costs and merits
of individual policies in various amounts less than the
maximum of $100,000 to which they were entitled, and the
effects of the insurance upon their estates and estate taxes.
Each of the brothers had some reservations, based mainly
upon costs, and the meeting ended with agreement that they
would consider the matter and then contact Mr. Windsor and
advise him as to how much insurance they wished to obtain
by way of conversion.
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On July 24,.1973, a Ms. Iscowitz of the home
office of the Company called the Belmar District Office,
of which Mr, Windsor was District Sales Manager, and the
Guilford District Office, in which Mr. Fried was
employed as an Agent and in which Mr. James Ross was
then serving as Acting District Sales Manager, to inform
them of the conversion rights under the automobile
dealership group policy.

Mr. Ross, on behalf of the

Guilford Agency, thereupon called Mr. Charles Kelly at
his office in Baltimore, and Mr. John Kelly who was on
vacation in Ocean City, Maryland.

The following week,

while himself in Ocean City, Mr. Ross again telephoned to
Mr. John Kelly, was unable to obtain a meeting with him
at that time and place and arranged for a meeting at
Mr. Kelly's Baltimore office on August 6, 1973, at 8:30 a.m.
That meeting vas cancelled by a telephone call from Mr.

_ .

Kelly's office and Mr. Ross was told by Mr. Kelly later that
day that he had already made arrangements for the conversion
and would not require the services of Mr. Ross.
Mr. Ross testified that he knew the Kelly brothers

.!

very well and that he had met with Charles Kelly, Sr., on
•

July 24, 1973.

By his own testimony, it is clear that

- -

Mr. Ross did not meet personally with John Kelly at any time

:-
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in connection with the subject conversion.

According

to the testimony of Charles Kelly, Sr., he did not know
Mr. Ross and had never seen him before the day of the hearing
herein.

In this connection, I find that no meetings took place

at any time between Mr. Ross and Mr. Charles Kelly, Sr., in
connection with the subject conversion.

Agent Fried did not

know, had never met and never had any insurance business dealings with either of the Kelly brothers, nor is it alleged1 by
the Union that he did.

Nor was it shown that Ross, Fried or

any other Guilford district employee ever sold any insurance
to or ever canvassed or serviced insurance for or of either of
the Kelly brothers.
On August 20, 1973, there was a further conference between
Mr. Windsor and the Messrs. Kelly at which they finalized their
decision to take conversions to individual $100,000 policies and
the applications for these conversions were signed by the brothers
at Mr. Windsor's office on August 24, 1974.
In September or October, 1973, Mr. Windsor met on separate
occasions with the wives of Charles Kelly, Sr., and John Kelly,
spending several hours with each, to explain to them the conversion,
benefits, etc.
The Union relies upon Article XIII of the Agreement which
provides that compensation shall be paid according to certain
schedules annexed to the Agreement, including Schedule I which
deals with commissions for Conversions from Group Insurance,
"subject to the rules and regulations
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of the Company . . . "

There is thus no express language

in Article XIII which specifically provides for the diversion of new business relating to conversion to an Agent
or the payment to an Agent of commissions on such business.
Schedule I merely shows the rates of commission payable
for such business.
The Union also cites certain Company directives,
however, maintaining that if these documents are read
together with Article XIII, it will be seen that payment
of commissions to Windsor rather than to Fried was in
violation of the Agreement.
Granting to the Union the most favorable construction of the cited documents and assuming, arguendo,
that:
1.

the words "subject to the provisions
of the rules and regulations of the
Company" in Article XIII constitute
an incorporation into the contract to
the benefit of the Union of all such
rules and regulations; and

20

the Company directives (Field Management Procedural Changes - New Business
Leads, 9/8/72 and Supplemental Rules
for District Management, Clause 50-B)
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cited by the Union are Rules and
Regulations of the Company in contemplation of Article XIII; and
3.

the said directives are intended to
govern inter-district business rather
than to regulate intra-district operations;

it, nevertheless, appears that no basis can be found to
sustain the Union position herein.

The first directive, Field

Management Procedural Changes deals with the handling of new
business referred to a District or Branch Office.

The Procedure

is clearly intended to protect the established interest or
claim of any Company representative who may already have rendered
service to the prospect.

If no such interest or claim exists,

it is the further purpose of the Procedure to provide for an
equitable distribution of such new business, on a rotating
basis, to all members of the sales force.

Similarly, Clause 50-B

of the Supplemental Rules for District Management, the second
directive cited by the Union, is clearly intended to provide
for equitable distribution of new business to all sales personnel
and to prevent Management personnel exploiting their special
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positions and greater access to new business at the expense of
other members of the sales force.

In my view these cited

directives were not intended to apply to business obtained as
that of the Messrs. Kelly was obtained, nor can any reasonable
reading of those directives support such an interpretation.
The Messrs. Kelly did not go the "Public Window," nor did they
telephone the Company office.

And even if that procedural

provision applied, the Company's Clerk is required to first
establish if the "person has any preference for a particular
representative."

Only if "no preference is given" is "present

Metropolitan Business in the family" relevant.
clearly indicates that the Kellys

Here, the record

had a preference for Windsor,

making inconsequential the fact that Fried had written or
serviced insurance on other members of the Kelly family.
But I do not find that this was a "lead" within that
meaning.

Rather the Kellys

approached Windsor personally,

outside of his office, in what can be described only as a
social setting and against a background of over twenty years
of personal acquaintance and friendship and asked for his advice
and assistance, which he gave.
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I cannot conclude that the directives in question were
intended to require that a District Manager turn the matter
over to another representative, unknown to the prospect, under
those circumstances.
Nor under the instant facts and circumstances was Clause
50-B of the Supplemental Rules for District Management violated.
It prohibits a District Manager from writing insurance for his
own credit in only two situations; where a claiming agent 1.
has written company insurance for the prosect within the p^eding
two years, or 2. has canvassed or serviced the prospect within
the preceding 12 months.
the District Manager.

No other limitations are placed on

Neither Agent Fried nor Mr. Ross, who

acted on his behalf throughout this matter, could satisfy either
of these conditions. By July 24, 1973, when Ross and, perhaps,
Fried, first heard of the Kelly account, Windsor had already been
servicing that account, at the specific request of the two
prospects, for several months.

It follows that Fried and Ross

had acquired no status protected by Clause 50-B.

Under that

circumstance together with the fact that there are only two
specific contractual limitations on a District Manager writing
insurance for his own credit, I find no basis to award the commission
to Fried on different grounds, namely because the Kellys resided
in Fried's geographic district.

Accordingly the grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

